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This thesis is a collection of three self-contained chapters about first-price auctions with 
independent private values.   
Bidding above the risk neutral Nash equilibrium (overbidding) has been a consistent 
finding in the experimental literature of first-price private value auction for decades. Risk 
aversion was initially widely accepted as the explanation of such a phenomenon. Recently, 
some papers, such as Lange and Ratan (2010) and Delgado, Schotter, Ozbay, and Phelps 
(2008), have identified that loss aversion is also responsible for overbidding.  
Chapter 1 is therefore inspired by this: if loss aversion can play a role in overbidding in 
the standard first-price auction where the losers actually have no monetary loss, then what 
happens if we impose a device in which the losers face a ‘loss’?  We conjecture that the 
overbidding should be even stronger, such that revenue increases.   
We design a novel device called a ‘payback scheme’, in which all the bidders receive an 
initial capital balance before the auction starts, and they can use any of it to submit bids. 
However, only the winner keeps the initial capital balance, whereas all the losers have to 
‘pay it back'. We provide and compare the homogeneous risk aversion and loss aversion 
equilibrium bidding models, and the corresponding revenue predictions for a first-price 
private value auction in a simple single-unit auction scenario with uniformly distributed 
private values. The model predicts that the scheme can increase the seller’s revenue if the 
bidders are loss averse and the more loss averse the bidders, the more revenue should 
increase.   
By conducting a series of experiments, we compare the realised bids and the revenues 
with and without the payback scheme. We find that, even though the bidders on average 




market size and ii) the amount of the initial capital balance retained by the winner relative 
to the maximum private value. Moreover, we also identify that for each bidder, the elicited 
risk preferences are not stable across different institutions – a first-price auction method 
and a Becker-DeGroot-Marschask (BDM) lottery procedure.   
As mentioned above, risk aversion is a commonly used explanation for the overbidding 
phenomenon in first-price private value auctions. Originally, the literature assumed 
bidders displayed a homogeneous risk aversion attitude (Holt, 1980; Maskin & Riley, 
1980). Cox, Roberson, and Smith (CRS) (1982), and Cox, Smith and Walker (CSW) 
(1988) develop a general constant relative risk aversion model (CRRAM) that 
incorporates three cases for the bidders:  
 They are all risk neutral. 
 They are equally risk averse.  
 They differ in their risk averse attitudes.  
The CRRAM relaxes the unrealistic assumption that the bidders’ risk attitudes are the 
same, and instead assumes that the bidders’ risk parameters can differ and are from a 
commonly known distribution. However, such a model is only valid to explain the bids 
that do not exceed a certain limitation. Beyond this limitation, the bid-private value 
relationship becomes nonlinear. The exact value of this limitation directly depends on the 
bidders’ prior belief of the support of the risk parameter distribution.  
Henceforth, two questions are brought about. Firstly, how does changing the assumption 
of the distribution influence the nonlinear part of the bid functions? Secondly, how does 
changing the support of the distribution influence the estimated individual risk parameter? 
Van Boening, Rassenti and Smith (1998) solve the first question. Chapter 2 addresses the 




(1982), and Cox, Smith, and Walker (1983, 1985), which include various market sizes – 
3, 4, 5, 6, and 9. We consider two representative cases of the distribution support for the 
risk parameters: risk neutral (𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1) and risk loving (𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 2).  
We draw two main conclusions from the analysis. First, changing the support of the 
distribution indeed varies the estimated individual risk parameter. Secondly, and more 
importantly, despite the first finding, the two distributions themselves remain unchanged.  
In addition, we also compare individuals’ loss aversion coefficients elicited from our 
lottery experiment (which also appears in Chapter 1) with another lottery experiment 
conducted in 2014 by Pezanis-Christou and Wu. Similar to the analysis of risk parameter 
distributions above, we find that the distributions of the average loss aversion parameters 
are stochastically equivalent for the two experiments.      
The first two chapters both study the first-price auction in the single-unit application. 
Chapter 3 transfers the research object to the multi-unit first-price auction, more 
specifically, sequential first-price private value auctions. Building on the results of 
Chapter 1, we compare how bidders respond to ‘loss’ and how that would influence the 
seller’s revenue across the single-unit and sequential auction institutions.  
To achieve this, we re-examine the data of Keser and Olson (1996). They have a 
particularly interesting penalty treatment, in which all the bidders act as agents, and those 
who fail to acquire an item (losers) need to pay a penalty to the implicit principal. Such a 
treatment has a connection with the payback scheme in Chapter 1 since in the two 
treatments, the losers both face a monetary loss. Therefore, it allows us to have a full 
picture of how bidders respond to ‘loss’ and how that would influence the seller’s revenue 




We rigorously derive the risk neutral Nash equilibrium (RNNE) bidding strategy and 
consequential revenue prediction for each stage in the sequential first-price private value 
auction with a penalty. Overall, we find that the penalty influences bidding behaviour 
differently from the RNNE bidding strategy, in the following four aspects: i) the estimated 
piecewise linear bidding function is non-monotonic; ii) the price declines across stages 
instead of remaining constant; iii) the bids actually depend on the price of the previous 






















First-price sealed bid auction, as one of the four primary auction types (the other three are 
English, Dutch, and second-price auction) used to allocate items, is widely adopted in the 
field. The bidding rule is easily understood: The bidders write their bids for the item and 
deliver them to the auctioneer; the auctioneer determines the highest bidder, and the 
highest bidder gets the item for a price equal to his own bid. There are two forms of 
application for first-price auctions. The first is that the bidders are ‘buyers’, and the 
highest bidder wins the auction; the other is the bidders are ‘suppliers’ (i.e. construction 
contracts as in Vickrey, 1961), and the lowest bidder wins. In this chapter, we focus on 
analysing the first-price sealed bid auction with independent private value bidders. For 
independent private value (IPV) auctions, each bidder knows the value of the item to 
himself and the distribution from which the bidders’ valuations are independently drawn.     
Vickrey (1961) was the first to apply game theory to build the theoretical model for 
independent private value actions. By assuming risk neutral bidders, he derived the 
unique risk neutral Nash equilibrium (RNNE) bid functions for first-price and second-
price auctions given that the private values are drawn from a uniform distribution. 
Furthermore, he demonstrated that the first-price auction is strategically equivalent to the 
Dutch auction, and pointed out that the second-price auction (Vickrey auction) is 
equivalent to the conventional English auction.  
However, overbidding in first-price auctions with independent private values is consistent 
with experimental findings which suggest that bidders consistently bid above the RNNE 




anomaly was initially explained by the constant relative risk aversion model - CRRA 
(CSW, 1988). The intuition behind this is that the subject prefers a sure gain by submitting 
a higher bid to a risky but potentially greater gain with a lower bid. However, as 
mentioned by Kagel and Roth (1995, p. 525), ‘risk aversion is one element, but far from 
the only element generating bidding above the RNNE’, many alternative behavioural 
models also give explanations for this anomaly.    
Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2002) compare bidders’ behaviour with a two-bidder market 
in two first-price private value auction treatments (low and high private values with a 
group of six discrete values in each). The treatments have the same RNNE bid, but differ 
in the curvature of the loss function. Overbidding is observed for both treatments and is 
more common in the high value treatment as conjectured. They find that the quantal 
response equilibrium (QRE) model with risk aversion fits the bidding data well, whereas 
the ‘pure joy of winning’ model is reasonable, but does significantly worse.1          
Dorsey and Razzolini (2003) study the bidding behaviour in two equivalent environments: 
the first-price private value auction, and the lottery choice. In the auction experiment, 
each bidder competes against three simulated bidders who use the RNNE bidding strategy. 
With regards to the first-price auction, there are two treatments - a baseline treatment and 
one in which each individual is provided the probability of winning with a particular bid, 
after which he can either submit or revise the bid. By examining the bidding behaviour, 
they find that showing the subjects the probability of winning the auction causes the bids 
at high private values to become less aggressive and closer to the RNNE bids, thus 
suggesting that the misperception of the probabilities of winning plays some role in 
overbidding.  
                                                          




Filiz and Ozbay (2007) introduce regret theory, which incorporates the payoffs from the 
forgone alternatives in the expected utility function to explain overbidding. The study 
implements a series of one-shot first-price auction experiments in order to analyse the 
impact of anticipated loser and winner regret in first-price auctions using a between-
subject design. Choosing a one-shot game instead of the typical repeated rounds game 
rules out the learning effect. There are three treatments based on what information is 
revealed to all subjects at the end of the auction - that is, the winning bid (loser regret), 
the second highest bid (winner regret), and no information feedback. They find that 
subjects do not seem to anticipate winner regret, as the estimated slope of the bid function 
(0.77) is not significantly different from that in the no feedback treatment (0.79), whereas 
they do identify anticipated loser regret, as the estimated slope of the bid function is 
significantly higher under this condition (0.87).     
So far, the explanations discussed are all based on the expected utility framework. 
Another strand of literature considers the endogenous reference dependence (introduced 
by Koszegi & Rabin, 2006) to analyse standard auctions, such as Lange and Ratan (2010). 
They develop the Koszegi-Rabin framework in first- and second-price auctions and find 
an additional explanation - loss aversion also leads to overbidding in induced private 
value first-price auctions.2 For the standard first-price auction, there is no monetary loss 
for the bidders since the payoff for the losers is zero; they fail to buy the item but also do 
                                                          
2  However, loss aversion does not lead to overbidding in the field auction setting. This is because field 
auctions also include a commodity dimension whereas the lab auctions only include one dimension. More 
specifically, in the lab auctions, normally the auction item and the bidders’ payments are measured in the  
same monetary dimension (the property of inducing value for the auction item permits that we can perfectly 
observe the private values) whereas in the field auctions, the auction item (i.e. wine, house, etc.) is in the 
commodity dimension. Intuitively, in the lab (induced-value) auctions, the loss (relative to the expected 
payoff) occurs when a subject losses the auction and increasing bid would decrease the potential loss of 
money. To the contrary, in the field (commodity) auctions, the monetary loss happens when a subject wins 
the auction and decreasing bid would decrease the potential loss of money.  Overall, the effect of loss 





not pay at all. As a result, the ‘loss’ actually occurs when the bidder expects to win but 
loses the auction. Naturally, we consider what might happen if we come up with an 
auction scheme in the first-price auction in which the losers really lose some money. 
Would such a scheme generate even stronger overbidding? If so, we also want to know 
whether it will enhance the seller’s revenue, since maximising such revenue is one major 
goal of an auction design.  
Therefore, we come up with a new and simple device which permits us to test the above 
conjectures. This device is called ‘payback’, in which each bidder receives an initial 
capital balance before the auction starts and can use the money when submitting his bid. 
However, after the highest bid has been announced, only the winner can keep the initial 
capital balance whereas all the losers need to ‘pay back’ the initial capital balance to the 
seller. Thus, within this scheme, we stimulate the losers facing a ‘loss’ relative to the 
situation in which they receive the initial capital balance.  
Loss aversion would arguably play a role in this scheme. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
first formulated the concept of loss aversion which before was widely argued in 
psychology. A central result of loss aversion is that the people are much more sensitive 
to potential losses than potential gains. The phenomenon of loss aversion is well 
established in the experimental literature, and it is widely observed in both risky and 
riskless choice decisions (Rabin, 2000; Fehr & Goette, 2007; Kahneman, Knetsch, & 
Thaler, 1990).  
Much of the research relevant to loss aversion also lies within neuroeconomics (Tom et 
al., 2007; Delgado et al., 2008). Anticipated or actual losses may cause individuals to 
experience negative emotions leading to loss aversion. A joint paper by cognitive 




This novel paper provides insight into the neural circuitry of experimental auctions and 
uses such insight to understand overbidding. They design three treatments: baseline, 
‘loss-frame’ which emphasises loss, and ‘bonus-frame’, which emphasises bonus (or 
gain). Overall, they find a stronger tendency to overbid in the ‘loss-frame’ treatment. This 
chapter exploits this stronger tendency to overbid in ‘loss-frame’ auctions to potentially 
increase the seller’s revenue. We also provide the Nash equilibrium bidding strategies 
under two assumptions for bidders: risk aversion and loss aversion. This allows us to 
obtain a hypothesis that the seller’s revenue should be increased with the payback scheme 
if the subjects are loss averse.    
In this chapter, we conduct a series of first-price private value auctions with and without 
the payback scheme using a within-subject design, thus eliminating the subject-specific 
effect. In addition, both a large market (n=6) and a small market (n=3) are chosen to 
compare the corresponding bidding behaviour and the revenue results.  
Our study and Delgado et al. (2008) both use the same measurement for the seller’s 
revenue: the winner’s bid minus the initial capital balance given to him. However, the 
main experiment result is different. In Delgado et al. (2008)’s experiment, both the bids 
and the revenue are greater in the ‘loss-frame’ treatment relative to the ‘baseline’ 
treatment. To the contrary, in our payback scheme treatment, even though the subjects 
indeed bid higher, actually the seller’s revenue is significantly less than in the standard 
first-price auction for the 6-bidder market and not significantly different for the 3-bidder 
market. Therefore, we conclude that using the payback scheme to enhance revenue 
depends vitally on the amount of the initial capital balance relative to the maximum 
possible private value. In Delgado et al. (2008), the ratio is 15%, whereas such a ratio 




cannot offset the cost of the initial capital balance retained by the winner, which leads to 
the payback scheme failing to increase revenue in our experiment.    
The remainder of the chapter is laid out as follows. In the next section we introduce the 
theoretical framework and the predictions of the Nash equilibrium bids and expected 
revenues. In Section 1.3 we present our experimental design in detail. Section 1.4 and 1.5 
report the main results. In Section 1.6, we compare the risk aversion coefficients across 
different institutions, and then in Section 1.7 we explore the conditions when the payback 
scheme works in terms of enhancing revenue. More specifically, we re-estimate the bid 
function using the experimental data provided by Delgado et al. (2008) and compare such 
results with our experiment. Finally, Section 1.8 concludes this chapter.   
 




In this section we derive bidders’ equilibrium bidding strategies in a payback scheme 
first-price auction. Consider there are 𝑛 bidders participating in a first-price sealed-bid 
auction. They compete for a single object and submit sealed bids 𝑏1, 𝑏2, … , 𝑏𝑛. The bidder 
who submits the highest bid is awarded the object, and pays his bid. Each bidder 𝑖 =
{1, 2, … , 𝑛} has a private value 𝑣𝑖  which is an independent draw from a uniform 
distribution 𝐹 defined on [0, 1] . The number of bidders 𝑛  and the distribution 𝐹 are 
common knowledge, but the value realization 𝑣𝑖  is private information.   
With the payback scheme, each bidder receives an initial capital balance 𝐾 before the 




the money 𝐾 only if he is the winner; if he loses the auction, he has to give the money 𝐾 
back to the seller. That is the reason why we name such a scheme ‘payback’.  
We derive the equilibrium bidding strategies by considering the signalling problem of 
bidder 𝑖 , given that all other bidders (𝑗 ≠ 𝑖) use the same increasing, differentiable 
bidding strategy 𝑏(∙) to map their own private values into bids. Bidder 𝑖 is not obliged to 
reveal his true type 𝑣𝑖, so he can select a private value 𝑧𝑖 from the uniform distribution 𝐹 
and submit a bid of 𝑏(𝑧𝑖). Next we use the revelation principle to derive the symmetric 
Nash equilibrium bidding strategy. More specifically, we verify bidder 𝑖 has no incentive 
to bid as if he had a private value 𝑧𝑖 ≠ 𝑣𝑖. 
1.2.2 Risk Averse Symmetric Nash Equilibrium model (RASNE) 
 
Vickrey (1961) was the first to derive the Nash equilibrium bidding function in 
independent private-value auctions assuming that bidders are all risk neutral. Holt (1980), 
Maskin and Riley (1980), and Harris and Raviv (1981) extend the Vickrey model to the 
case that bidders are risk averse. More specifically, they assume that the bidders display 
a homogeneous risk averse attitude and the corresponding expected revenue is greater 
than if they were risk neutral.   
Since the assumption of the bidders sharing the same risk attitude is restrictive, Cox, 
Roberson, and Smith (1982) construct an equilibrium bidding model (CRRA) that permits 
bidders to differ in their risk attitudes with a utility function 𝑢𝑖(𝑦) = 𝑦
𝑟𝑖  where the 
individual constant relative risk preference parameter 𝑟𝑖 is from a probability distribution 
Φ on [0, 1]. Each bidder knows his own risk parameter 𝑟𝑖  as well as the probability 
distribution Φ. An important feature of the bid function  𝑏𝑖 =
𝑛−1
𝑛−1+𝑟𝑖




applies to bids that do not exceed 𝑏 =
𝑛−1
𝑛
 which is the maximum bid that the least risk 
averse (in other words, risk neutral) bidder would submit.  
Cox, Smith, and Walker (1988) generalise the CRRA model to 𝑟𝑖 ∈ (0,  𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥], where 
 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≥ 1 which stands for the risk parameter for the least risk averse bidder. In this 
model, the least risk averse bidder could be a risk neutral or a risk-loving bidder, which 
depends on the prior belief of  𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥. We will discuss how changing  𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 influences the 
estimated individual risk parameter in Chapter 2. In this chapter, we focus our analysis 
on the Nash equilibrium bidding strategy in a first-price payback scheme auction for 
homogeneous bidders. 
The probability of bidder 𝑖 (bidding as if he had a private value 𝑧𝑖) winning the auction 
is that all the other 𝑛 − 1 bidders’ private values are smaller than 𝑧𝑖, which is 𝐹(𝑧𝑖)
𝑛−1 =
𝑧𝑖
𝑛−1.  Bidder 𝑖’s expected utility is defined as  
𝐸𝑈𝑖(𝑧𝑖) = 𝑧𝑖
𝑛−1(𝐾 + 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑏(𝑧𝑖))
𝑟
+ (1 − 𝑧𝑖
𝑛−1)(𝐾 − 𝐾) 
𝐸𝑈𝑖(𝑧𝑖) = 𝑧𝑖





                                                               
It must have the property that for any true private value 𝑣𝑖, the expected utility function 




|𝑧𝑖=𝑣𝑖 = 0 
 (1.2.2) 
                                                                                                                      
Which yields the following first order differential equation 
    
𝑏′(𝑣𝑖) =








for all 𝑣𝑖  in the interval [0,1], equation (1.2.3) is solved by the following risk averse 
symmetric Nash equilibrium (RASNE) bidding function:3 
𝑏(𝑣𝑖)
𝑅𝐴𝑆𝑁𝐸 = 𝐾 +
𝑛 − 1












0 which satisfies the maximising profit requirement. Therefore, if every bidder is using 
the same bidding function 𝑏(∙), it is optimal for all bidders to reveal their true types.  
When 𝑟 = 1 then equation (1.2.4) reverts to Vickrey’s benchmark risk neutral Nash 
equilibrium (RNNE) model 
𝑏(𝑣𝑖)





                             
                                  
                                                                      
1.2.3 Loss Averse Symmetric Nash Equilibrium model (LASNE) 
 
In this section, instead of assuming subjects display a homogeneous risk averse attitude, 
we presume that they share a homogeneous loss aversion coefficient  𝜆 > 0 . Such a 
coefficient only plays a role when subjects experience a loss. A subject with 𝜆 > 1 is loss 
averse, and the greater the value of 𝜆, the more loss averse the subjects is. A subject 
with  𝜆 = 1 is loss neutral, whereas 𝜆 < 1  indicates the subject is gain-seeking. To 
simplify the model, we also assume the subjects are risk neutral where 𝑟 = 1. Therefore, 
bidder 𝑖 ’s expected utility is defined as 
𝐸𝑈𝑖(𝑧𝑖) = 𝑧𝑖
𝑛−1(𝐾 + 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑏(𝑧𝑖)) + (1 − 𝑧𝑖
𝑛−1)(𝐾 − 𝜆𝐾)  (1.2.6) 
 
                                                          
3 The full deviation of 𝑏(𝑣𝑖)




As in the last section, for any private value 𝑣𝑖, the expected utility function (1.2.6) is 
maximised by setting 𝑧𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖. Therefore 𝑣𝑖, should again, satisfy 
𝜕𝐸𝑈𝑖(𝑧𝑖)
𝜕𝑧𝑖




Hence, we obtain the following first order differential equation 
 
𝑏′(𝑣𝑖) =







for all 𝑣𝑖  in the interval [0,1], equation (1.2.8) is solved by the following loss averse 
symmetric Nash equilibrium (LASNE) bidding function: 
𝑏(𝑣𝑖)






When subjects are loss neutral (where  𝜆 = 1 ), then equation (1.2.9) also reverts to 
Vickrey’s benchmark risk neutral Nash equilibrium (RNNE) model as in Equation (1.2.5).   
  
1.2.4 Expected revenue predictions 
 
In equilibrium, the seller’s expected revenue is determined by evaluating the 
corresponding Nash equilibrium bidding strategy at the expected highest value in the 
uniform distribution[0, 1], which is 
𝑛
𝑛+1
. Hence, with regards to the RASNE model    
𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐴𝑆𝑁𝐸 = 𝐾 +
𝑛 − 1















When 𝑟 = 1 then equation (1.2.10) becomes   





 𝑛 − 1 
 𝑛 + 1 
 
   
 (1.2.11) 
 
with respect to the LASNE model, the seller’s expected revenue is equal to 
 








𝐸𝑅𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑁𝐸 = (𝜆 − 1)𝐾 +
𝑛 − 1






When 𝜆 = 1  then equation (1.2.12) also becomes equation (1.2.11), from which we 
obtain that the expected revenue 𝐸𝑅𝑘=0
𝑛=6 = 𝐸𝑅𝑘=0.5
𝑛=6 = 0.71 and  𝐸𝑅𝑘=0
𝑛=3 = 𝐸𝑅𝑘=0.5
𝑛=3 =
0.50.                 
In addition, the predictions allow us to formulate the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1a (RASNE): The seller’s expected revenue would not be influenced by the 
payback scheme if subjects are risk averse. 
𝑅𝑘=0 = 𝑅𝑘=0.5 
 
Hypothesis 1b (LASNE): The seller’s expected revenue would be enhanced with the 
payback scheme if subjects are loss averse. 
 
𝑅𝑘=0.5 ≥ 𝑅𝑘=0 (𝑖𝑓 𝜆 ≥ 1) 
 
Hypothesis 2: (RASNE & LASNE): The seller’s expected revenue would always be 
greater in the larger market. 
𝑅𝑛=6 > 𝑅𝑛=3 
 
 
1.3 Experimental design 
 
We ran the experiments using the software Z-Tree at the University of Adelaide’s 




subjects from the undergraduate and postgraduate population of the University were 
recruited by the ORSEE system and participated in 4 sessions. In a given session, each 
subject participated in 4 experiment stages: two lottery experiments and two auction 
experiments. Quiz questions were given to subjects before each experiment stage, and a 
stage only began when all subjects answered the quiz questions correctly. Each session 
lasted about 90 minutes. Subjects received written instructions which were read aloud and 
could ask questions to the experimenter in private. A copy of the experimental 
instructions is given in Appendix A. Including a show-up fee of $10, subjects earned $20 
on average.  
The result of each experiment was not revealed until the end of the session, in order to 
keep the decision for each experiment task independent. The subject was paid according 
to his aggregate payoffs from the 4 experiment stages.   
 
1.3.1 The first lottery experiment stage 
 
The aim of the first lottery experiment is to measure subjects’ loss aversion attitudes. 
Subjects decided whether or not to accept 14 risky lotteries as shown in the first column 
of Table 1.3.1, one of which would be randomly selected for payment. For each lottery, 
there is a 50% chance of winning and a 50% chance of losing.  
To determine which lottery would be chosen, a number between 1 and 14 was randomly 
drawn for each subject. If the subject chose to ‘Accept’ the corresponding lottery, his final 
payoff was adjusted according to the result of the lottery; if the subject chose to ‘Reject’, 
then he got zero from this experiment task. As explained earlier, in order to keep the 
decision for each experiment task independent, the result of this first lottery experiment 




Table 1.3.1 The design of the 14 risky lotteries in the first lottery stage 
  Lottery 50%/50% chance Expected Value 
 #1    Lose $0.5 or win $9.5 $4.50  
 #2    Lose $1 or win $9 $4  
 #3    Lose $1.5 or win $8.5 $3.50  
 #4    Lose $2 or win $8 $3  
 #5    Lose $2.5 or win $7.5 $2.50  
 #6    Lose $3 or win $7 $2  
 #7    Lose $3.5 or win $6.5 $1.50  
 #8    Lose $4 or win $6 $1  
 #9    Lose $4.5 or win $5.5 $0.50  
 #10    Lose $5 or win $5 $0  
 #11    Lose $5.5 or win $4.5 -$0.5  
 #12    Lose $6 or win $4 -$1  
 #13    Lose $6.5 or win $3.5 -$1.5  
  #14    Lose $7 or win $3 -$2   
 
1.3.2 The second lottery experiment stage 
 
Following the completion of the first lottery task, a second lottery experiment was 
conducted for eliciting subjects’ certainty equivalents for 11 lotteries. 4  Each lottery, 
initially owned by the subject, has a 50% chance of a high payoff 𝐻 and a 50% chance of 
a low payoff 𝐿  as shown in columns 1-3 of Table 1.3.2. Certainty equivalents were 
elicited using the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) (1963) incentive mechanism, which 
gives the subject an incentive to report his true valuations for the corresponding lotteries. 
The procedure was as follows. The subject was asked to state a minimum selling price 𝑝𝑠 
(between the high and low payoff) for each lottery, with the knowledge that a random 
buying price 𝑝𝑏 (also between the high and low payoff) would be drawn to determine if 
the lottery would be sold to the computer. If 𝑝𝑏 ≥ 𝑝𝑠, the subject received the randomly 
drawn buying price; otherwise, he received the outcome of the lottery.   
                                                          
4 We used the same 11 lotteries as in Kocher, Pahlke, and Trautmann (2010). The differences between the 
high and low payoffs for the lotteries are always even numbers: 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10. It makes the arithmetic 




As with the first lottery experiment, only one lottery would be chosen for each subject to 
decide his payoff in this BDM lottery task, and the result would not be revealed until the 







Table 1.3.2 The design of the 11 lotteries in the second lottery stage 
  Lottery High payoff Low payoff Expected   
    (50% chance) (50% chance) value   
 #1 12.76 4.76 8.76  
 #2 8.30 2.30 5.30  
 #3 10.70 2.70 6.70  
 #4 6.52 2.52 4.52  
 #5 13.22 5.22 9.22  
 #6 8.06 2.06 5.06  
 #7 6.36 2.36 4.36  
 #8 13.20 3.20 8.20  
 #9 9.76 5.76 7.76  
 #10 12.76 6.76 9.76  
  #11 8.01 2.01 5.01   
Note: Numbers in columns 2-4 show amounts in AUD. The expected value for the 
corresponding lottery was not shown to the subjects. 
 
 
1.3.3 The auction experiment stages 
 
The auction experiment was designed to test whether the payback scheme enhances the 
seller’s revenue. We used within-subject variation. Therefore, subjects were exposed to 




which we refer to as k0 and k5 treatment hereafter. In both auction stages, subjects were 
in the same group of six bidders for 20 rounds. The k0 treatment is the control treatment 
since it accords with a large number of laboratory studies.  
In this chapter, the k5 treatment is the novel treatment. In the k5 treatment, subjects 
received $5 as the initial capital balance they could use to bid before each auction started. 
Only the winner got to keep the $5; all the losers had to pay the $5 back. Due to the order 
effect that exists in the within-subject design, it was necessary to run the treatments in 
both orders: k0k5 order and the reverse, k5k0 order. In the k0k5 order of the treatment, 
subjects participated in the standard private value first-price auction for the first 20 rounds 
and then for the second 20 rounds, they were switched to the conditions of the payback 
scheme. With respect to the k5k0 order, subjects were exposed to the treatments in 
reversed order.  
To study the effect of the payback scheme on seller’s revenue, we also examined two 
different market sizes: 6-bidder market and a 3-bidder market using a between-subject 
design. For both market sizes, at the beginning of the auction stage, the computer 
randomly allocated subjects to markets of size 𝑛 = 6. Additionally, to form the 3-bidder 
market, in each auction round, the fixed group of six bidders was re-matched into two 3-
bidder markets.5 This matching method, on the one hand, provides independent units of 
observation. On the other hand, it constitutes a comparison with the 6-bidder market. We 
use the notation k0k5_6 to represent the experiment session with the k0k5 order in a 6-
bidder market.     
In each round, subjects’ private values were independently drawn from a uniform 
distribution defined on [$0, $10]. Each subject was required to submit a bid equal to or 
                                                          
5 Such a design is similar to Schram and Onderstal (2009), except that in their experiment, the subjects did 




below his private value in the k0 treatment, and equal to or below his private value plus 
$5 in the k5 treatment. The winner was the subject who submitted the highest bid and 
paid a price equal to his bid. In the case of a tie, the winner was randomly chosen among 
the bidders who submitted the highest bid. In each market, at the end of each auction 
round, the winner’s bid (but not identity) was disclosed to all the subjects. Table 1.3.3 
summarises our auction experiments.     
Each subject’s payoff in the two auction stages was decided by the computer, which 
randomly chose two auction rounds for each treatment. The summation of the payoffs 
from the four rounds was the subject’s payoff from the auction experiment. 
Table 1.3.3 The design of the auction experiments 
  Market size Session Treatment # Subjects # Groups   
 6 
k0k5_6 K01, K52 18 3  
 k5k0_6 K51, K02 18 3  
 
       
 3 
k0k5_3 K01, K52 12 2  
  k5k0_3 K51, K02 12 2   
 
 
1.4 Descriptive analysis for two lottery tasks  
 
1.4.1 Loss aversion 
 
As in Rabin (2000) and Fehr and Goette (2007), the rejection of a small-stake risky lottery 
with a positive expected value can be interpreted as loss aversion instead of risk aversion. 
So we can use the first lottery task to measure the subject’s loss aversion attitude. In this 
task, the least loss-averse (i.e. the most gain-seeking)6 subject would choose to accept all 
14 lotteries because of the 50% chance of winning some money, even though the expected 
values are negative from lottery #11 to lottery #14. To the contrary, an extremely loss-
                                                          




averse subject would choose to reject all the 14 lotteries since all the lotteries include a 
50% chance of losing money. Overall, a subject would reject more lotteries if he is more 
loss-averse. Hence, we can use a subject’s switch point from accepting to rejecting a 
specific lottery to measure his loss aversion. Among all the 60 subjects, four subjects have 
more than one switch point (6.67% of all the subjects). For these subjects, we only analyse 
the first switch point as per Prasad and Salmon (2013).7 
Before devising a framework to calculate each subject’s loss aversion coefficient, it is 
necessary to first have a general idea about the distribution of accepted lotteries among 
all the 60 subjects. Figure 1.4.1 shows the distribution of the number of accepted lotteries 
in the loss aversion measurement stage. The mode of the number of accepted lotteries is 
6 (12 subjects), in which the expected value is $2. 
 
Figure 1.4.1 Distribution of the number of accepted lotteries   
 
Suppose the lottery chosen to determine the subject’s payoff is (50% chance of 
winning  𝑤, 50% chance of losing 𝑤′ ). We adopt the expected utility framework to 
illustrate the utility a subject gets from the first lottery stage:  
                                                          
7 Some papers, like Laury and Holt (2005), only investigate the ‘one switch point’ choice pattern and ignore 





𝑤, 𝑤 ≥ 0
𝜆𝑤′, 𝑤′ < 0
 
 
where 𝜆 is the loss aversion coefficient. The first equation represents the utility of a 
subject winning whereas the second equation measures the disutility of losing. A larger 
loss aversion coefficient 𝜆 represents that the subject is more loss-averse, as the feeling 
of losing money is more painful. A subject will accept a lottery if: 
 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛)𝑢(𝑤) + 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒)𝑢(𝑤′) > 0  
 
A subject will reject a lottery if: 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛)𝑢(𝑤) + 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒)𝑢(𝑤′) < 0  
 
When a subject is indifferent between accepting and rejecting a lottery, it must be that:  
 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛)𝑢(𝑤) + 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒)𝑢(𝑤′) = 0 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛) =  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒) = 50% 
𝑢(𝑤) + 𝑢(𝑤′) = 0 






The above equation is satisfied when we exactly know the lottery for which the subject is 
indifferent between accepting and rejecting. However, we can only observe a switch point 
for each subject. For instance, if a subject accepts the first 2 lotteries, but rejects the next 
12 lotteries, we know the accurate indifferent lottery must lie between #2 and #3. 
Therefore, according to this model, the loss aversion coefficient 𝜆 must lie in the interval 
(5.67, 9]. As mentioned by Anderson and Mellor (2009), a common technique for dealing 




accounts for interval censoring of the dependent variable, in this scenario loss aversion 
coefficient 𝜆, as well as left and right censoring.8 The subjects who accept between 1 and 
13 lotteries are interval censored observations; those who accept all the 14 lotteries are 




∗ = 𝜇 + 𝜀𝑖  (1.4.1) 
 
                                                                                                              
We do not observe subject 𝑖 ’s loss-averse attitude𝜆𝑖  (𝜆𝑖 > 0) directly. However, we 
instead observe 𝑦𝑖 , which indicates the number of lotteries that subject 𝑖 accepts. The 
notation 𝑦𝑖 implies a range for 𝜆𝑖
∗
, which is delimited by [𝜆𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥]. For this reason, 
instead of 𝜆𝑖, we model the latent variable  𝜆𝑖
∗
as in equation (1.4.1). In equation (1.4.1), 
𝜀𝑖 is a normally distributed error with mean zero and variance 𝜎
2.  
A maximum likelihood procedure has been used to estimate this model. After obtaining 
the estimated intercept  𝜇 , subject 𝑖 ’s expected loss aversion coefficient given the 
corresponding number of accepted lotteries is computed in the following way: 
                                                          
8 Interval censoring describes the case when a data point is somewhere on an interval between two values. 
Left (right) censoring represents that when a data point is below (above) a certain value but it is unknown 
by how much.     
9 However, we know that the loss aversion coefficient must be a positive figure. So for those who accept 
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The range of [𝜆𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥] for the corresponding number of accepted lotteries and the 
expected loss aversion coefficient 𝜆∗ are shown in Table 1.4.1. We also report the related 
percentage of subjects for each number of accepted lotteries. Within all the 60 subjects, 
15% of them accept all ten lotteries with a non-negative expected value, a further 15% of 
subjects accept at least one lottery with a negative expected value, and the remaining 70% 
of subjects reject at least lottery #10 (which has an expected value of zero) or some 
lotteries even with positive expected values. The median subject accepts lotteries #1 to 
#7, which implies that the median value of 𝜆 is 1.68.10 Such a result is qualitatively 
similar to the median value of 𝜆 (2.25) reported by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Hence, 
we find that loss aversion is a significant pattern for the subjects. 
It is instructive to compare the results with those of a similar experiment. The paper by 
Gächter, Johnson, and Herrmann (2007) measure the individual-level loss aversion using 
six 50-50 lotteries. The winning money is fixed at €6, whereas the loss varies from €2 to 
                                                          
10 We can think of an example to have a intuitively understanding of 𝜆 = 1.68. That is, a subject must gain 
$1.68 to offset the disutility of losing $1. Therefore, as 𝜆 increases, a subject need to gain more money to 




€7. They find a similar result that the median subject has a loss aversion coefficient 𝜆 =
1.2.  
 
Table 1.4.1 The loss aversion parameter for the corresponding number of accepted 
lotteries 
 
 # Accepted # Subjects Percentage Cum.  [𝜆𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥] 𝜆   
  Lotteries   (%) Percentage (%)       
 0 0 0.00 0.00 (19, ∞) n.a.  
 1 2 3.33 3.33 (9, 19] 9.49  
 2 3 5.00 8.33 (5.67, 9] 6.44  
 3 0 0.00 8.33 (4, 5.67] n.a.  
 4 10 16.67 25.00 (3, 4] 3.47  
 5 2 3.33 28.33 (2.33, 3] 2.66  
 6 12 20.00 48.33 (1.86, 2.33] 2.10  
 7 7 11.67 60.00 (1.5, 1.86] 1.68  
 8 3 5.00 65.00 (1.22, 1.5] 1.36  
 9 3 5.00 70.00 (1, 1.22] 1.11  
 10 9 15.00 85.00 (0.82, 1] 0.91  
 11 4 6.67 91.67 (0.67, 0.82] 0.75  
 12 2 3.33 95.00 (0.54, 0.67] 0.61  
 13 0 0.00 95.00 (0.43, 0.54] n.a.  
  14 3 5.00 100.00 (0, 0.43] 0.22   
Note: ‘Cum. Percentage’ represents the cumulative percentage. Where the value for 𝜆 is 
‘n. a.’, no subject accepts the corresponding number of lotteries. 
  
 
1.4.2 Risk aversion 
 
Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1964, BDM) originally devised a method to determine 
a monetary equivalent of a wager. Harrison (1986) subsequently applied this method to 
elicit a subject’s risk aversion attitude. The basic idea of the BDM method is to endow 
the subject with a series of predetermined lotteries and ask him for a selling price for each 
lottery with the acknowledgment that a buying price is generated randomly irrespective 
of the selling price he asks. By this method the subject has an incentive to truthfully reveal 




Before computing each subject’s risk aversion coefficient, it is useful to statistically 
compare the CE and the expected value for the 11 lotteries. We report the corresponding 
figures as well as the results from Kocher, Pahlke, and Trautmann’s (KPT) (2010) 
experiment in Table 1.4.2. Four out of 11 lotteries’ average CEs are greater than the 
corresponding expected values. With regards to KPT’s experiment, all the 11 lotteries’ 
CEs are smaller than the corresponding expected values. 
 
Table 1.4.2 The average certainty equivalent for each lottery in our experiment and 
KPT’s experiment 
  Lottery Expected Average Average   
    Value CE  CE (KPT)   
 #1 8.76 8.80 7.82  
 #2 5.30 4.99 5.00  
 #3 6.70 6.82 6.03  
 #4 4.52 4.29 4.10  
 #5 9.22 9.59 8.54  
 #6 5.06 4.83 4.70  
 #7 4.36 4.05 3.94  
 #8 8.20 9.08 7.83  
 #9 7.76 7.53 7.22  
 #10 9.76 9.66 8.93  
  #11 5.01 4.76 4.68   
Note: ‘Average CE’ is the average certainty equivalent in our experiment; ‘Average CE 
(KPT)’ stands for the average certainty equivalent in KPT (2010). Figures in bold font 
are greater than the corresponding expected values. 
 
 
Next, it is necessary to identify the extent of each subject’s risk aversion coefficient within 
the expected utility framework. We denote the utility function when a subject receives 
money 𝑤: 





In such a utility function, the notation 𝑟 is the risk preference parameter whereas (1 −
𝑟) is the Arrow-Pratt measure of the relative risk aversion coefficient.11 If a subject states 
a selling price 𝑝𝑠 for a lottery with a 50% chance of getting a high payoff 𝐻 and a 50% 
chance of getting a low payoff 𝐿, then it must be that the utility of the monetary payoff 
𝑝𝑠 is the same as the utility from the risky lottery, such that:      
𝑢(𝑝𝑠) = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐻)𝑢(𝐻) + 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐿)𝑢(𝐿)                      
𝑝𝑠
𝑟 = 0.5𝐻𝑟 + 0.5𝐿𝑟                                                            
 
As per KPT (2010, p. 13) we also use a nonlinear least squares technique to estimate each 
subject’s risk preference coefficient 𝑟 based on the selling price 𝑝𝑠 that he states, as well 
as the given lottery’s high payoff 𝐻 and the low payoff 𝐿. The model we use is as follows:  
 𝑝𝑠𝑖 = (0.5𝐻
𝑟𝑖 + 0.5𝐿𝑟𝑖)
1





in equation (1.4.2), the normal distribution error term 𝑢𝑖 has a property of mean zero and 











                                                          











Table 1.4.3 Risk preference classification and the corresponding number of subjects 
  









 (1.95, ∞) 15 (25%) 27 
(45%) 




 (1.49, 1.95] 5 (8.33%) 6 (4%) very risk loving 
 (1.15, 1.49] 7 (11.67%) 18 (12%) risk loving 
        
 (0.85, 1.15] 11 (18.33%) 
11 
(18.33
%) 34 (22.67%) 
34 
(22.67
%) risk neutral 
       










 (0.32, 0.59] 3 (5%) 17 (11.33%) risk averse 
 (0.03, 0.32] 2 (3.33%) 18 (12%) very risk averse 
 (-0.37, 0.03] 3 (3.33%) 15 (10%) 
highly risk 
averse 
  (-∞, 0.37) 9 (15%) 16 (10.67%) stay in bed 
Note: We obtained KPT’s experiment data from Appendix D. of ScienceDirect website 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292115000677.  
 
In Table 1.4.3, we report the estimated range of the risk preference coefficient 𝑟 and the 
corresponding number of subjects in our experiment as well as in KPT’s experiment.12 
Here, we follow the risk preference classification as per Holt and Laury (2002). In our 
experiment of 60 subjects, 45% of them are risk loving; whereas 11 subjects (18.33%) 
are risk neutral, and the remaining 22 subjects (36.66%) are risk averse.   
                                                          
12 KPT does not report subjects’ risk aversion preferences in both the 2010 and 2015 papers. However, we 




The results from KPT’s experiment are inconsistent with our finding. That is, the majority 
of subjects are risk averse (59.33%) and only 18% of subjects are risk loving while 22.67% 
of subjects are risk neutral.13,14 
After identifying each subject’s loss aversion coefficient 𝜆 and risk aversion coefficient 
(1 − 𝑟), we wonder whether these two coefficients are related to each other as Thaler et 
al. (1997) suggest. In their experiment, the subjects need to make some investment 
decisions between two funds – bond and stock funds, within four conditions – monthly, 
yearly, five-yearly, and inflated monthly. A major conclusion they get is: “Investors who 
display myopic loss aversion will be more willing to accept risks if they evaluate their 
investments less often.” In this BDM lottery experiment, if we consider a lottery decision 
as an investment, the subject can only know the result of the investment at the very end 
of the experiment. This prohibits them from adopting a ‘narrow framing’ as defined by 
Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) – in other words, considering decision problems one at a 
time. As a result, it is not very surprising that 45% of subjects are risk loving.  
In order to examine whether the two estimation parameters are correlated, we create a 
scatter plot of the (1 − 𝑟) and 𝜆 along with histograms of the two variables as in Figure 
1.4.2.15 We can see that there is no clear linear correlation between these two variables.16  
                                                          
13 We have excluded the possibility that the difference is due to the 11 lotteries being presented to the 
subjects in a different manner between our experiment and KPT’s. For both experiments, the 11 lotteries 
are shown to the subjects on 11 separate pages.  
14 However, these results are close to the findings reported by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (2003). In their 
design, the basic essence of the BDM method is the same. But instead of a 50-50 lottery, they use a 30-
sided die and a cut-off value  𝑝 to decide the payoff for the subject if his selling price is above the randomly 
generated buying price. Hence, they find that within 48 subjects, about 55% of them are risk loving. 
15 In figure 1.4.2, we have eliminated two outliers with an extremely large negative risk aversion coefficient 
(-273.6), which shows that the corresponding subjects are extremely risk loving. In the BDM lottery stage, 
the two subjects both stated a selling price 𝐻 for all the 11 lotteries.  
16 We also cannot observe a linear relationship when we use (∑ 𝑝𝑠 , 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠) as variables to 




In terms of the risk aversion coefficient, most subjects cluster in the range of [-2, 2]. With 
regards to the loss aversion coefficient, the majority of subjects are between 0 and 4.17 
Our result is very different from the result reported by Goldstein, Johnson, and Sharpe 
(2008), in which they find that for the 570 subjects in their experiment, the estimates of 
the risk aversion and loss aversion parameters are correlated.18 Most of their subjects 
displayed a low risk aversion, as well as a low loss aversion attitude. It is acknowledged 
that besides the distinction of the two experimental designs, the inconsistency of the 
results could be due to sample size differences.  
  
Figure 1.4.2 Graphical illustration of the relationship between loss aversion and risk 
aversion coefficients using a scatter plot and histograms. 
 
 
1.5 Experimental results for auction stages 
 
1.5.1 Modelling bid behaviour 
 
                                                          
17 As a robustness check, the nonparametric Spearman test shows that for the 58 (1 − 𝑟, 𝜆) pairs, the two 
variables are independent from each other ( 𝑝-value > 0.1).  
18 The two variables have a very clear linear correlation not only from the chart but also verified by a 
Pearson correlation test. 































In order to identify how the payback scheme works in the first-price auctions, in this 
section we use a panel data regression approach to estimate the aggregate bid functions. 
As mentioned before, we use a within-subject design for the auction experiment, in which 
each subject experiences two first-price auction treatments: standard (k0) and a novel 
payback scheme (k5). Neugebauer and Perote (2008) also use a within-subject design to 
compare the bids of first-price auctions in two treatments: with and without the 
information feedback. In this chapter we follow their method to model the bidding 
behaviour. The model is as follows 
 0 1 2 3kit kit kit kit kit k kitbid Dk pv Dk pv v           (1.5.1) 
                                                 
In equation (1.5.1), 𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑘𝑖𝑡 and kitpv denote the bid and the private value of subject 𝑖 of 
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. 𝛽𝑗  are the 
parameters to be estimated, 𝑗 = {0, 1, 2, 3}, 𝜀𝑘𝑖𝑡 is an error term, which is assumed to have 
mean zero and variance𝜎𝜀
2; 𝑣𝑘 is the group-specific term. This model accounts for the 
possible structural changes between the k0 and k5 treatments by using a dummy 
variable  𝐷𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 , which takes the value one for the k5 treatment and zero for the k0 
treatment. Since this dummy variable interacts with both the intercept and the slope, we 
can interpret the results from Table 1.5.1 as the bid functions for each treatment. 
As in Section 1.2, we derive the RNNE and LASNE bidding strategies in the case of first-
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As illustrated in Section 1.4.1, the subjects are loss averse on average (𝜆 > 1). Therefore, 
if the subjects bid according to the RNNE or LASNE model, we have the following 
hypotheses 
𝐻10: 𝛽1 ≥ 5 
    𝐻20: 𝛽3 = 0    
 
The null hypothesis is that the payback scheme should only influence the intercepts while 
not affecting the slopes. We start by discussing the estimated intercepts. From the 
coefficients of the dummy variable 𝐷𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡  shown in Table 1.5.1 below, we can find that 
𝛽1 < 5 which implies that the subjects would not use all of the $5 given to them to submit 
their bids in the payback auctions. In three of the four sessions, on average, subjects use 
around $4 (80% of $5) to bid. For the k51 treatment in the 3-bidder market, the subjects 
on average only use around $3 (60% of $5) to bid. This result suggests that the RNNE 
and LASNE models both fail to explain the realized bids for the payback first-price 
auctions, as they overestimate the impact of the payback scheme on the intercept. 
Table 1.5.1 also reveals that 𝛽3 is significantly positive in the last session: k5k0_3. Bids 
in the payback scheme treatment involve a significantly higher fraction (0.153) of private 
value than the standard first-price treatment, which is inconsistent with the RNNE and 
LASNE predictions.  
Result (payback scheme effect): in all four sessions of the payback first-price auctions, 
the subjects use some but not all of the initial capital balance k to submit bids. 
Furthermore, the subjects reveal a higher fraction of their private values in the session 
with a 3-bidder market where subjects are exposed to the payback scheme before 

















Table 1.5.1 Coefficients of random effect regression: linear bid function 
     Dependent variable: bid   
 Independent n=6  n=3  
  Variable k0k5 k5k0  k0k5 k5k0   
              
 Intercept -0.391 -0.313  -0.079 0.002  
  (0.277) (0.185)  (0.209) (0.001)  
        
 Dk 4.065*  4.067*   4.097*  2.914*  
  (0.306) (0.535)  (0.304) (0.172)  
        
 pv 0.878*  0.948*   0.702*  0.790*  
  (0.030) (0.014)  (0.048) (0.032)  
        
 Dk X pv 0.050 0.016  0.093 0.153*  
  (0.099) (0.062)  (0.059) (0.074)  
        
 R
2 overall 0.762 0.840  0.887 0.736  
 # Observations 720 720  480 480  
  # Groups 3 3   2 2   
Note: estimate for equation 1.5.1, (robust standard error in parentheses); * significant 
at 5%. 
   
 
After identifying the treatment effect of the novel payback scheme, it is also instructive 
to analyse the bidding behaviour in the control treatment: standard first-price auctions. If 




𝐻30: 𝛽0 = 0 
    𝐻40: 𝛽2 = 0.83 (𝑛 = 6) 
              𝛽2 = 0.67 (𝑛 = 3) 
 
From Table 1.5.1, we can verify that 𝐻30 is correct. At the same time, subjects’ bids as a 
fraction of private value are substantially greater in the k02 treatment compared with the 
k01 treatment for both the 3-bidder and 6-bidder markets. It may be that subjects get used 
to submitting high bids during the payback scheme and as a result continue to submit high 
bids once the payback scheme is removed (‘anchoring’).19 Therefore, we observe an order 
effect in bidding behaviour for the k0 treatment.    
Result (order effect in the k0 treatment): for the standard first-price auctions, the subjects 
bid a higher fraction of their private values if they experience the payback scheme first.  
When we take a closer look at 𝛽2 in four sessions, we cannot reject 𝐻40 for the two k01 
sessions. However, we have to reject 𝐻40 in favour of the alternative hypothesis that 𝛽2 
is greater than the corresponding RNNE prediction for the two k02 sessions. Overall, in 
the standard first-price auctions where the subjects have no experience of the payback 
scheme, the bidding behaviour can be explained by the RNNE prediction; for the subjects 
who have experienced the payback scheme in advance, their bids exceed the RNNE 
prediction. 
 
Result (bid vs RNNE prediction in the k0 treatments): 
1 6 6 3 3
2 6 6 3 3
For the k0  treatment: ;
For the k0  treatment: ;
RNNE RNNE
n n n n
RNNE RNNE
n n n n
bid bid bid bid
bid bid bid bid
   




                                                          
19 We do not find any evidence that learning (experiment rounds) plays a role in bidding behaviour, which 





We also use Figure 1.5.1 to demonstrate the relationships between the realized bids and 
the corresponding RNNE predictions for two markets in standard auctions while 





Figure 1.5.1 The bids and the RNNE predictions in the k0 treatment 
 
 
1.5.2 Seller’s revenue and the allocation efficiency  
 
Revenue and efficiency are the two main measurements for evaluating an auction format. 




















































scheme can enhance the seller’s revenue, we first analyse the realized revenue by 
checking the two hypotheses in Section 1.2.4.    
Before using econometric methods to verify the conjectures, we first report the revenue 
statistics in Table 1.5.2.20 From Table 1.5.2, we can observe that the k02 treatment brings 
the greatest revenue for both market sizes on average (7.93 and 6.32, respectively). 
Besides this, between the two market sizes, the revenue in the 6-bidder market is always 
greater. Such findings are consistent with our results for the estimated bidding functions 
as illustrated in the previous section.   
Table 1.5.2 The statistics of average revenue and efficiency of the two treatments for 
both market sizes   
                  Revenue   Efficiency 




1 60  7.39 1.02  98.21% 0.05 
 2 60 
 7.93 0.96  98.56% 0.04 
 
  
       
 k5 
1 60  7.5 1.43  97.48% 0.06  
 2 60 
 7.06 1.14  93.59% 0.16  
 
   




1 40  5.11 0.97  96.92% 0.08  
 2 40 
 6.32 1.10  95.14% 0.14 
 
  
       
 k5 
1 40  5.4 1.64  88.91% 0.19 
  2 40   5.12 1.20   93.42% 0.12 
Note: With respect to the third column ‘Batch’: ‘1’ and ‘2’ represent the corresponding 
treatment in auction rounds 1-20 and 21-40, respectively.  ‘Mean’ is obtained by taking 
the average of each group across 20 rounds with the specific treatment and batch. ‘S.D.’ 
is the standard deviation of the average. 
 
In this section, we use a random effect panel data regression model similar to that used 
by Schram and Onderstal (2009), which includes variables for both treatment effect and 
order effect. In this chapter, the model explaining realized revenue is given by: 
                                                          
20 With the payback scheme, since we need to take the $5 given to the winner into consideration, the realized 




 0 1 2kt kt kt k ktR Dk Order u         (1.5.2) 











. The other variables are the same as in 
equation (1.5.1). Therefore, the control treatment is the standard first-price auction with 
no experience about the payback scheme (k01). Table 1.5.3 shows the results. The 
estimated coefficient of ktDk is significantly negative in the 6-bidder market (-0.38) 
whereas it is insignificant in the 3-bidder market. 
Revenue Result (payback scheme effect): In the 6-bidder market, the seller’s revenue 
is smaller with the payback scheme whereas it is not significantly different in the 3-
bidder market.  
6 6 3 3
5 0 5 0;
n n n n
k k k kR R R R
      
 
At the same time, we can see that the coefficient of ktOrder is significantly positive for 
both market sizes, indicating that the revenue for the standard first-price auction is greater 
when the subjects have experienced the payback scheme. This result is consistent with 
our finding in the previous section that the estimated slope is greater in the k02 treatment 
compared to the k01 treatment. Furthermore, this coefficient is larger in the 3-bidder 
market. Figure 1.5.2 plots the difference between the realized price and the RNNE 
predicted price for each round in both the 3- and 6-bidder markets in the corresponding 
k01 and k02 treatments. We can see that for the k02 treatment, the differences between the 
realized prices and the RNNE predicted prices are invariably above zero, especially for 






Figure 1.5.2 The difference between observed prices and RNNE prices in the k01 and 
k02 treatments 
Note: In the 6-bidder market, for each auction round in a given treatment we compute the 
average difference between the realized prices and the RNNE-predicted prices across the 
associated 3 groups. In the 3-bidder market, we follow the same method, except that there 
are only 2 groups in a given treatment.    
Revenue Result (order effect): In the standard auction format, the seller’s revenue is 
increased if bidders have experienced the payback scheme in advance; moreover, this 
revenue increasing is greater in the 3-bidder market.  
2 1
2 1 2 1
0 0
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k k
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There are two earlier papers which also compare the realized prices with the RNNE 
prediction in first-price auctions of 3-bidder and 6-bidder markets. Cox, Roberson, and 
Smith (1982) find that the RNNE prediction cannot be rejected for the 3-bidder market 
whereas in the 6-bidder market, overbidding behaviour is observed. However, Dyer, 
Kagel, and Levin (DKL) (1989) identify a different result, which is that the winning bids 
exceed the RNNE prediction for both 3- and 6-bidder markets.21 
                                                          





















































Besides revenue differences due to the treatment effect and the order effect, Hypothesis 
2: 6 3n nR R   is easily verified as the coefficient of the intercept term is significantly 
greater in the 6-bidder market.   









Table 1.5.3 Coefficients of random effect and pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regressions for two market sizes   
     Dependent variable: Revenue 
 Independent n=6  n=3  
  Variable RE model Pooled OLS  RE model   
            
 Intercept 7.41* 7.41*  5.35*  
  (0.138) (0.136)  (0.159)  
       
 Dk -0.37* -0.38*  -0.50  
  (0.075) (0.078)  (0.330)  
       
 Order 0.49*  0.49*   0.77*  
  (0.153) (0.150)  (0.104)  
       
 #Observations 240 240  160  
  BP test p=0.32     p<0.05   
Note: estimate for equation (1.5.2), (robust standard error in parentheses); * significant 
at 5%. For each revenue observation with 3-bidder market of each group k, in each round 
t, we compute the average revenue for two subgroups. The BP test (Breusch and Pagan 
test) for random effect tests 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑢𝑘) = 0, is rejected for the 3-bidder market, but not for 
the 6-bidder market.22 
                                                          
22 For the panel data analysis, when choosing between different panel models, we need to test for the 
individual specific effects. The null hypothesis for the BP test is the individual specific variance component 
is zero. In the 6-bidder market p-value=0.32, we cannot reject the null hypothesis, which suggests that there 





As a result, the payback scheme fails to increase the seller’s revenue, which differs from 
the theoretical model prediction. However, we find that the seller’s revenue can be 
increased in the standard first-price auction if the subjects have experienced the payback 
scheme before. Therefore, even if the payback scheme itself does not enhance the revenue, 
including this scheme as a trial session before the standard first-price auctions, will give 
the subjects the inertia to submit a higher bid.   
Having addressed the revenue comparison between treatments, next we look at the second 
measurement - allocation efficiency for the two treatments. To determine the allocation 
efficiency, we compute the following equation which represents the percentage of surplus 










                                                                                                 
where winnerpv  stands for the winner’s private value and highestpv  is the highest private 
value. We report the corresponding results in the last column of Table 1.5.2. On average, 
the auction is more efficient in the k0 treatment for both market sizes. This is not 
surprising, because in the payback scheme auction, the bidders can bid up to their private 
values plus $5. It gives the bidder an opportunity to win the auction who uses a larger 
proportion of the $5 when submitting his bid, even though his private value is not the 
highest.   
 






A number of papers (such as Isaac & James, 2000; Neugebauer & Selten, 2006) identified 
an overbidding phenomenon and use risk aversion to explain it. In addition, they find out 
what is the individual’s risk preference parameter 𝑟 in first-price auctions.   
In this section, we will qualitatively compare the risk parameters for each group within 
our two experimental institutions: the first-price auction and the BDM lottery. Here, ‘first-
price auction’ refers to the k0 treatment only. As we have shown in Section 1.5.1, for the 
k5 treatment, the estimated intercept of the bid function is significantly less than k, which 
goes against the RASNE and the LASNE predictions. Following Isaac and James (2000), 
Engel (2009), and Neugebauer and Selten (2006), we back out the risk parameter 𝑟𝑖 using 
the observations of bids and private values for the specific market size within the RASNE 
model. However, unlike these papers, we do so for each group instead of each subject. 
This is because in this chapter our homogeneous risk preference assumption is different 
from their heterogeneity assumption.23      


















Therefore, the bid data is used to estimate the linear bid function below, and we remove 
the ‘zero’ bids from the observations. 
 i i i i ib pv e     (1.6.2) 
                                   
                                                          
23 However, we acknowledge that our experiment design does not guarantee this assumption holds since 
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In our data presentation, we restrict our attention to those bidder groups which satisfy the 
equilibrium condition that 𝛼𝑖 is not significantly different from zero. We report the results 
of the estimated group risk preference parameters using equation (1.6.3) in Table 1.6.1. 
As can be seen from the table, the estimated intercepts in groups 7 and 9 are significantly 
positive. Therefore, we do not consider the risk parameters in these two groups. Within 
the eight groups for which the risk preference parameters 𝑟 can be estimated, most groups 
display different levels of risk aversion in the auction task.24 In Table 1.6.1, we also report 
the corresponding results from the BDM lottery task. As we have shown in Section 1.4.2, 
most groups are risk loving in the BDM lottery stage. Overall, our study confirms the 
instability of risk parameters across different institutions as widely observed by a number 
of papers, e.g. Isaac and James (2000), Anderson and Mellor (2009), and Hey, Morone, 
and Schmidt (2009).25  
                                                          
24 We use the same classification as in Section 1.4.2.  
25 Different from Isaac and James (2000), which also reported the instability of risk preferences between 
the first-price auction task and the BDM selling procedure, Anderson and Mellor (2009) identify the 
instability between monetary rewards experiment and a job-based gambles survey; Hey, Morone and 






Table 1.6.1 Risk preference parameters in the auction and BDM tasks for each group  
    Auction task (k=0)   BDM task 
Group   ?̂? ?̂? ?̂? Classification # Obs.   𝑟_𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 Classification 
1  0.126 0.861* 0.807 slightly risk averse 114  1.043 risk neutral 
2  -0.325 0.882* 0.669 slightly risk averse 102  0.701 slightly risk averse 
3  -0.115 0.835* 0.988 risk neutral 113  1.340 risk loving 
4  -0.180 0.888* 0.631 slightly risk averse 107  1.126 risk neutral 
5  0.102 0.907* 0.513 risk averse 114  1.221 risk loving 
6  -0.051 0.951* 0.258 very risk averse 111  1.407 risk loving 
          
7  0.210* 0.646* n.a. n.a. 117  2.519 highly risk loving 
8  -0.321 0.756* 0.646 slightly risk averse 113  1.850 very risk loving 
9  0.388* 0.748* n.a. n.a. 106  1.614 very risk loving 
10   0.211 0.800* 0.500  risk averse 115   3.990 highly risk loving 
Note: *significant at 5%. Each group includes 6 subjects who submit bids for 20 rounds in standard auctions, so there are 6 × 20 = 120 
observations for each group. After censoring the ‘zero’ bids, as shown in the column ‘#Obs.’, the applicable number of observations is less 




1.7 Relevant research    
 
Delgado, Schotter, Ozbay, and Phelps (2008) report a similar experimental design which 
combines neuroeconomic and behavioural economic techniques. Behavioural economic  
techniques analyse subjects’ experimental decisions to test theoretical predictions. The 
neuroeconomic approach extends this field by adding observations from the nervous 
system. Using the finding of neural circuitry, they conjecture that by ‘manipulating the 
parameters of a first-price auction to highlight the potential for loss, it would not only 
increase bids, but also raise more revenue.’  Therefore, they conduct three treatments in 
a first-price auction format: baseline, loss-frame, and bonus-frame.  
We report the differences of the experimental designs between this chapter and their 
article in Table 1.7.1. Delgado et al. (2008) adopt a between-subject design, which means 
each subject only participates in one treatment. Another major difference is that in their 
experiment, the amount of initial capital balance K given to each subject before the 














Table 1.7.1 First-price auction experimental designs in this chapter and in Delgado et al. 
(2008). 
    Our Experiment   Delgado et al. (2008) 






frame         
K 0 5 
 













    
        
Rounds 20 
 
30         
PV AUD[0,10]   [0, 100] Experimental dollars 
Note: In Delgado et al. (2008), $1 USD = 60 experimental dollars.  
 
 
The main finding of their experiment is that the seller’s revenue is higher in the ‘loss-
frame’ treatment compared with the baseline treatment. Such results are very intriguing 
since in our experiment, the seller’s revenue is significantly smaller in the payback 
scheme auction relative to the standard first-price auction for the 6-bidder market, and 
not significantly different for the 3-bidder market, as we illustrated in section 1.5.2. In 
order to explore the reason why the schemes affect revenue differently, we compare 
Delgado et al.’s (2008) experiment results with our findings by re-estimating the bidding 
functions through normalized bids and private values in the unit interval, and also 
removing all the ‘zero’ bids.  Here, by pooling all the observations in the same market 
size and treatment together while ignoring the order effect, we report the corresponding 
results in Table 1.7.2.  
We need to mention that we could only obtain the bid data of 34 out of the 52 subjects 
who participated in the ‘loss-frame’ treatment in Delgado et al. (2008). Using the 
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available data, we obtain similar results to those reported by Delgado et al. (2008) – after 
normalizing, the average revenue is 0.456 and the random effect bid function is 𝑏 =
0.111 + 0.74𝑝𝑣. However, analysis of the baseline treatment in Delgado et al. (2008), 
due to the missing data issue could not be undertaken. Therefore, we choose to report the 
baseline treatment regression results as Delgado et al. (2008) provided in their paper.  
 
Table 1.7.2 The mean revenue and estimated random effect bid functions from our 
experiment and Delgado et al. (2008)’s experiment 
n   standard FP auction   payback scheme FP auction   
2 
Revenue 0.409   0.454   
       
RNNE bid   b*=0.500pv   b*=0.150+0.500pv   
Estimated Bid   b=0.614pv   b=0.109+0.733pv   
# Obs. 660   1018   
R2 0.805     0.757     
        
3 
Revenue 0.571   0.526   
       
RNNE bid   b*= 0.67pv   b*=0.500+0.67pv   
Estimated Bid   b=0.740pv   b=0.387+0.810pv   
# Obs. 451   480   
R2 0.862     0.631     
        
6 
Revenue 0.766   0.728   
       
RNNE bid   b*= 0.83pv   b*=0.500+0.83pv   
Estimated Bid   b=0.886pv   b=0.430+0.896pv   
# Obs. 661   681   
R2 0.945     0.745     
Note: ‘FP auction’ indicates first-price auction. In Delgado et al. (2008), ‘standard FP 
auction’ refers to the baseline treatment whereas ‘payback scheme FP auction’ refers to 
the loss-frame treatment. The figure of ‘# Obs.’ in each market size for the corresponding 
treatment is obtained by deleting all the ‘zero’ bids from the total number of bids.    
 
 
Table 1.7.2 clearly shows a common pattern for the estimated bid functions in our 
experiment and Delgado et al. (2008)’s experiment. That is, in the payback scheme first-
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price auctions, the estimated bid intercepts are always significantly below the RNNE 
predictions. With regards to the bid slopes, they are all greater in the payback scheme 
first-price auctions than the standard first-price auctions, but are only significantly greater 
in Delgado et al. (2008)’s experiment with a 2-bidder market. Therefore, by comparing 
the corresponding estimated bid intercepts and slopes, we obtain two possible 
explanations of the different revenue results within the payback scheme first-price 
auctions. Considering that the estimated intercept would be always smaller than 𝐾, a 
necessary requirement of the payback scheme enhancing the seller’s revenue is that the 
slope coefficient must be substantially greater compared with that in the standard first-
price auction. This is quite unlikely in the larger market sizes, because as market size 
increases, the slope coefficient already gets closer and closer to 1, and hence does not 
have much room to keep increasing.    
Compared with market size, determining a proper amount of initial capital balance 𝐾 is 
likely to play a more important role in whether the scheme enhances the seller’s revenue. 
We can see from both the experiment results that, such a scheme no doubt increases bids 
regardless of the amount of 𝐾. However, in our experiment, 𝐾 is set too high (50%) 
relative to the maximum possible private value 𝑣. Hence, even though bids increase due 
to the payback scheme, they increase by less than 𝐾 and hence revenue decreases.         
As a result, by combining the results of Delgado et al. (2008) experiment with our findings, 
we obtain the following two conditions, under which the seller’s revenue may increase in 
a payback scheme first-price auction: 
 Small market size 
 




1.8 Concluding remarks  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether a payback scheme in first-price private 
value auctions could enhance seller's revenue due to the existence of loss aversion. We 
derive a simple single-unit first-price private value auction model, which encompasses 
two cases - bidders display a homogeneous risk averse attitude or loss averse attitude. 
Based on the model, the payback scheme should increase the revenue if subjects are loss 
averse whereas it should not make a difference when subjects are risk averse.  
We design an auction experiment using within-subject variation. Each subject participates 
in two treatments: payback scheme (k5) and standard first-price auction (k0). We also 
take the order effect into consideration and conduct the experiment with k0k5 and k5k0 
orders in two market sizes (6-bidder and 3-bidder). However, the experimental results do 
not support the hypothesis. More specifically, the revenue within the payback scheme is 
statistically less than in the standard auction in the 6-bidder market and is not significantly 
different in the 3-bidder market. Nonetheless, the revenue in the standard auction is 
increased when subjects have experienced the payback scheme first.  
We suggest that the reason the payback scheme fails to enhance revenue in our 
experiment is that the subjects simply use a certain proportion of the initial capital balance 
K when submitting bids regardless of private value, and are not induced to respond more 
strongly to a marginal increase in private value. This is reflected in the intercept of the 
bidding function increasing by less than K and the slope not changing significantly. 
Therefore, although the subjects submit higher bids, this does not offset the cost of the 
initial capital balance K retained by the winner. Combined with the results reported by 
Delgado et al. (2008) in which the revenue is increased in the ‘loss-frame’ treatment, a 
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natural extension to our experiments in the future is to set a smaller K (e.g. $1.5) and to 
test if the payback scheme works or not.  
With regards to the experimental design, the future study could also implement another 
treatment in which only the winner obtains the money K, whereas all the losers receive 
nothing. Such an auction design is strategically equivalent to the payback scheme, and it 
would be interesting to compare the results to this chapter. There is also some scope for 
future research to extend the theoretical framework to incorporate reference-dependent 















Chapter 2: Heterogeneous risk attitudes in first-price independent 




Vickrey (1961) was the first to apply game theory to the study of auctions and derived 
the risk neutral Nash Equilibrium (RNNE) bidding strategy in first-price auctions. This 
remarkable theoretical paper also suggests the existence of a particular pricing rule that 
produces the same result as in the traditional English (ascending-bid) auction. That is, the 
winner pays the second highest bid (second-price auction) and Vickrey also demonstrated 
the dominant strategy – reporting values truthfully. Within the single-unit independent 
private value context, the Revenue Equivalence Theorem states that first-price auctions 
and second-price auctions yield the same expected revenue for the seller in the 
equilibrium. Actually, this theorem vitally depends on the assumption that all bidders are 
risk neutral. Vickrey also shows that the first-price auction and Dutch (descending-bid) 
auction formats are strategically equivalent; that is the bidder should bid strictly less than 
his willingness to pay, and the amount of shading from his willingness to pay should 
depend on his belief about his rivals’ bids.  
The RNNE model was first challenged by Coppinger, Smith, and Titus (1980), who 
implement a series of experiments and find that not only the winning prices, but also the 
bids in first-price auctions significantly exceed the RNNE predictions, and that the first-
price auction and Dutch auction are not ‘isomorphic’. Since then, numerous laboratory 
experiments have shown that bidders bid significantly higher than the risk neutral 
prediction (while still below value) in first-price auctions (CRS, 1982; CSW, 1988; Kagel 
& Roth, 1995; Kagel & Levin; 2011).  
51 
 
There is a huge amount of literature on what drives overbidding behaviour in first-price 
auctions. In particular, this includes risk aversion (CSW, 1988), Quantal Response 
Equilibrium (QRE) with risk aversion (Goeree, Holt, & Palfrey, 2002), misperception of 
probability of winning (Dorsey & Razzolini, 2003; Armantier & Treich, 2009), learning 
direction theory (Neugebauer & Selten, 2006); anticipation of regret (Filiz & Ozbay, 
2007); “missed-opportunity-to-win” regret (Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Katok, 2008); and 
loss aversion (Lange & Ratan, 2010). Among all of these, risk aversion is the most widely 
accepted explanation.  
Since risk aversion implies a steeper bidding function compared to the risk neutral bidding 
line, it does give a better approximation of actual bids. The homogeneous risk aversion 
assumption26 which requires all the bidders who participate in the first-price auction 
sharing the same risk attitude is a convenient assumption. Nonetheless, it is also a very 
strong and unrealistic assumption, since no matter in the field setting or in the laboratory, 
it is difficult to control the bidders’ risk preferences. Hence, heterogeneous risk aversion 
is often believed to be a more realistic assumption.  
The papers to first assume that the subjects differ in their risk preferences are by CRS 
(1982) and CSW (1982) (Constant Relative Risk Aversion, CRRA model). They have 
quite a large number of observations of bidding in auctions with 3, 4, 5, 6, and 9 bidders 
with uniform distribution values. Instead of assuming the same risk parameter, they 
suppose that the bidders’ risk preferences are from some distribution on (0, 1]. Each 
bidder knows his own risk parameter, and also knows the distribution. In 1988, Cox, 
Smith, and Walker formulate a model (log-concave), which includes risk loving 
preference in the CRRA model. The CRRA model encompasses both the homogeneous 
                                                          
26 Harris and Raviv (1981), Holt (1980), Maskin and Riley (1980) and Riley and Samuelson (1981). 
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and heterogeneous cases for the bidders’ risk preferences. In this chapter, however, the 
terminology ‘CRRA’ model particularly refers to heterogeneous risk aversion.  
In general, the CRRA model fits the experimental data quite well. For example, Palfrey 
and Pevnitskaya (2008) conduct a first-price auction with an outside option, which 
directly test the CRRA model. They observed a self-selection effect which will only arise 
with heterogeneous risk preferences. That is, if there is an outside option with a fixed 
payoff, the more risk loving bidders would still choose to enter into the auction stage, 
whereas the more risk averse bidders would choose not to, and claim the fixed payoff 
instead. Therefore, the bids are lower compared to the first-price private value auction 
without such an outside option.   
At the same time, the CRRA model has also led to a number of challenges. First, the 
CRRA model fails as a maintained hypothesis even for some subjects in CSW (1988)’s 
first-price auctions -  21.8% of subjects having bidding functions with significant nonzero 
intercepts, despite the CRRA model predicting a zero intercept (CSW, 1988, p. 77). 
Second, Harrison (1989) suggests an alternative way to interpret the experimental results 
by looking at the expected payoff space instead of observing the bid space as in the CRRA 
model. He argues that the expected cost of deviating from the risk neutral Nash 
Equilibrium is quite small (less than $0.05 at the median, the flat maximum critique).27 
To put it another way, when evaluating the bidding behaviours in terms of the forgone 
expected payoffs, the deviations from the RNNE model are no longer significant. Third, 
although risk aversion provides a good fit for some novel treatment conditions, for 
instance, when private values are drawn from a non-uniform distribution (Chen & Plott, 
                                                          
27 The payoff function around the maximum is flat. This also received some follow up criticism (see the 
detailed survey by Kagel & Roth, 1995): Friedman (1992) pointed out ‘a more appropriate payoff space 
should consider the consequences of all bids, not only those resulting in median expected losses’.   
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1998),28 there are still some auction settings where bids contradict the risk aversion 
hypothesis. These include second-price, third-price, multiunit first-price, and asymmetric 
auctions. The CRRA model fails to explain the persistent overbidding in second-price 
auctions (the winner pays the second-highest bid), since the dominant strategy of bidding 
one’s value is immune to risk attitude. The other finding is that in third-price auctions, 
the risk averse bidders should bid below instead of above the RNNE bidding line 
according to Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) model, as in first-price auctions. 
Kagel and Levin (1993) use a dual market procedure with five and ten bidders. They find 
that in the ten-bidder market, the majority of bids lie above the RNNE prediction, whereas 
at the same time, the majority of bids in auctions with five bidders are below the RNNE 
prediction. This implies that for the same group of subjects their risk attitudes change as 
the market size varies.  
A third example is in the multiple unit discriminate auctions conducted by Cox, Smith 
and Walker (1984) with N number of bidders competing for Q homogeneous objects. 
Four out of the ten treatments are characterized by a pronounced tendency of individuals 
to bid lower than the risk neutral prediction which implies risk-loving behaviour.  
A fourth example is asymmetric auctions, which refers to the auctions including strong 
bidders (whose valuations are likely to be higher) and weak bidders (whose valuations 
are likely to be lower). According to the theory, the expected revenue for second-price 
auctions should be higher than first-price auctions in the asymmetric value context.29 
However, in Pezanis-Christou (2002), the average revenue in the first-price auctions is 
stochastically greater than in the second-price auctions. This result cannot be attributed 
                                                          
28 They also comment that the CRRA result cannot rule out the possibility of bidders just using a linear 
decision rule such as a constant percentage markdown. 
29 This is because bidding one’s value is still a dominant strategy in second-price auctions, whereas in first-
price auctions the strong bidders place low bids when they get low values. 
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to risk aversion, as even with extremely risk averse bidders, the revenue difference would 
not be as much as the data suggest. The bids deviation from RNNE decreasing over time 
is also contrary to the risk aversion model which indicates that the bidding strategy is a 
constant proportion of the values. Despite the above shortcomings of the CRRA model, 
Kagel and Roth (1995, p. 536) summarise that risk aversion may have some role, but not 
the only role to play in explaining behaviour in private value auctions and risk aversion 
is very much used in empirical studies of auction data. Thus, we cannot rule out risk 
aversion as an explanation of overbidding in first-price auctions. 
The goal of this chapter is twofold. First, to check how the CRRA model’s predictions 
are affected by the assumptions used to define heterogeneity in first-price auctions. As 
we know, the CRRA model requires the subject to be aware of not only his own risk 
parameter, but also the distribution of the risk parameter in the population. In addition, 
the distribution is common knowledge to all the bidders. This is quite a strong assumption. 
Naturally we would think the bidders’ belief about the risk parameter distribution should 
matter a lot in estimating the risk aversion bidding function.  
The theoretical paper by Van Boening, Rassenti, and Smith (1998) illustrates how 
changing three assumptions-the maximum propensity to risk seeking  𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥, the expected 
value of bidders’ risk preferences 𝐸(𝑟), and the probability that a subject is risk loving 
𝑝(𝑟 > 1) would influence the nonlinear part of the bidding function. They use numerical 
methods to compute the Nash equilibrium bidding function in a four-bidder first-price 
auction by varying the three elements. They find that the effect of changing  𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 from 
two to three, does not appear to have a substantial effect on the bidding function and the 
shape of the risk parameter distribution, when 𝐸(𝑟) and 𝑝(𝑟 > 1) are held constant. In 
this chapter, as well as presuming each bidder differs in the risk attitudes, each bidder’s 
risk parameter is estimated in two different assumptions: one is that we limit the risk 
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aversion parameter in the range of zero to one, which represents that the bidders are risk-
averse or risk-neutral; the other is to push the risk aversion parameter boundary to two, 
so as to allow the possibility of risk loving. Then we compare the distributions within two 
assumptions. We find that although changing the support for the distribution influences 
each individual’s estimated risk aversion parameter, it does not significantly affect the 
distribution. Therefore, this chapter provides further evidence for the robustness of the 
CRRA model. Regardless of whether the bidders hold a relatively stronger common belief 
that no bidder is risk loving, or they share a more relaxed belief that some bidders are risk 
loving, actually the resulting distributions of individuals’ risk parameters are not 
substantially different.  
In addition, to give a complete idea of the subjects’ parameters and the corresponding 
distribution relating to a payoff uncertainty, analysis of the loss aversion coefficients is 
undertaken. The data from two groups of subjects participating in the same lottery task is 
used, which includes 14 lotteries that each subject must choose to ‘Accept’ or ‘Reject’. 
The first group is the 2016 experiment, which we explain and analyse in Chapter 1. The 
second group is from the 2014 experiment conducted by Pezanis-Christou and Wu (2014). 
After estimating the subjects’ loss aversion coefficient using interval regression technique 
and plotting the corresponding two groups’ distributions of the loss aversion parameters, 
we find that the two distributions are stochastically equivalent. Such a result, together 
with the results from the risk aversion parameters elicited in the first-price auction stage, 
suggest that the subjects’ parameters relating to risk are heterogeneous but quite stable 
within the same experimental institution with regards to the overall distribution.  
Another aim of this chapter is to identify the treatment effect in the unusual first-price 
auction design by CRS (1982). A standard first-price auction experiment consists of 
several auction rounds. Prior to each auction round, each subject’s private value is 
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determined randomly from the same distribution. Each subject’s private values in 
different auction rounds are independent. Different from the standard first-price auction, 
in CRS (1982)’s design the subjects were given all the private values they would have in 
the future auction rounds. Pezanis-Christou and Romeu (2006) pointed out that the 
experimental procedure used by CRS (1982) used to collect the data may have interfered 
with the outcomes. Nonetheless, so far there is no research on how the ‘all private values 
shown before the auction starts’ design could impact the bidding behaviour compared to 
the standard first-price auction design. Here, we observe that the bids are significantly 
lower in the design by CRS (1982) compared to the standard first-price auction 
experiment.    
This chapter is structured as follows. The next section presents the theoretical CRRA 
model of bidding with independent private values in first-price auction. Thereafter the 
equilibrium prediction is set out. Section 2.3 describes the data. The treatment effect and 
risk parameter estimation results, as well as the loss aversion coefficients results are 




Consider 𝑛 bidders participating in a first-price sealed-bid auction. They compete for a 
single object, which is awarded to the highest bidder for a price equal to his bid. Each 
bidder 𝑖 = {1,2, … , 𝑛} has an induced value 𝑣𝑖  which is an independent draw from a 
uniform distribution  𝐹 with support [0, 1] and density 𝑓. To present the CRRA model, 
we start from the equilibrium model with homogeneous risk averse bidders who share the 
same risk parameter  𝑟 . In Chapter 1, we show that the risk averse symmetric Nash 










However, since homogeneous risk aversion is a very restrictive assumption, CSW (1988) 
extended the model by assuming that the individual risk parameter 𝑟𝑖 is independently 
drawn from a continuous distribution Φ over the interval (0, 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥], where 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 stands for 
the least risk averse bidder’s risk parameter. Each bidder knows his own risk averse 
parameter  𝑟𝑖 , but only knows the others’ distribution Φ . In addition,  Φ  is common 
knowledge to all the bidders. When 0 < 𝑟𝑖 < 1 then bidder 𝑖 is risk averse; if 𝑟𝑖 = 1 then 









We need to emphasise that such a pure strategy equilibrium is not fully established. It 
only holds for bids that do not exceed 𝑏∗(CRS, 1982), where 𝑏∗ is the maximum bid that 
would theoretically be entered by the least risk averse subject in the population; and there 
is no closed form solution for bids over 𝑏∗.30 Therefore, it is difficult to verify whether 








                                                          
30 This is because for these bids we cannot disentangle the two reasons for the high bids: high private 
values or very risk-averse attitudes.  
58 
 
To address this problem, Van Boening, Rassenti, and Smith (1998) numerically solve the 
nonlinear part of the bid function in a 4-bidder market with uniformly distributed private 
values. With regards to the distribution Φ of the risk preference parameters, they assume 
that it is a beta distribution on [0, 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥] by verifying the values of the most risk loving 
bidder’s risk parameter in three cases:   𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Furthermore, in 
determining the nonlinear part of the bid function, they assume the existence of two 
additional parameters that do not enter into the linear part of the function. They are 𝐸(𝑟𝑖) 
and 𝑃(𝑟𝑖 > 1), which are the expected value of the risk parameters and the probability 
that any bidder is risk loving, respectively. As a result, they verify the nonlinear property 
of the bid function above 𝑏∗. In addition, they find that increasing 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 from 2 to 3 - while 
holding 𝐸(𝑟𝑖)  and 𝑃(𝑟𝑖 > 1)  constant, does not change the estimated bid function 




The data we use in this chapter is originally from 47 experiments executed variously by 
CRS (1982), CSW (1983), and CSW (1985). CSW (1988) also summarise the important 
characteristics of these experiments.  
The CRS (1982) experiments consist of 3 switchover sequences with 3, 4, 5, 6, and 9 
bidders: 10 first-price (Dutch) auctions, followed by 10 Dutch (FP) auctions, and finally 
another 10 first-price (Dutch) auctions. Since Dutch auctions are beyond our scope, we 
only illustrate how the first-price auction is conducted: in each round of the auction, the 
private values are drawn in multiples of $0.1 from a uniform distribution [𝑣, 𝑣]  with 𝑣 =
$0.1. Instead of giving the subject’s induced value at the outset of each round of the 
auction, there is a spread sheet that discloses the subject’s private values in all the 10 
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rounds, which is quite an unusual design. Across the different market sizes, in order to 
keep the subjects’ (as risk neutral bidders) expected earnings approximately constant, 
CRS (1982) deliberately set 𝑣  to increase as market size increases.31 The bidder can 
submit a bid up to his private value. The design of two experiments with 4 and 5 bidders 
by CSW (1983) followed the same procedure as CRS (1982), only with triple the payoff 
levels.32 
Compared with the above two groups of experiments, the first-price auction design in 
CSW (1985) with 3 and 4 bidders is quite standard in the sense that the subject only knows 
his private value in the current round. The private values are drawn in multiples of $0.01 
from a uniform distribution [𝑣, 𝑣]  with 𝑣 = 0 . Besides this, they have no information 
about how many auction rounds he will participate in. Furthermore, the bidder can bid up 
to 𝑣, which is the highest possible valuation instead of up to his private value. 
The information feedback is the same for all the treatments: at the end of each round, the 
subject finds out what the winning bid is. The final payoff for each subject is the 
accumulated payoff across all the auction rounds. The protocol details of the experiments 




                                                          
31  It permits some consistency over motivation since the theory predicts that the expected earning 
approaches zero as 𝑁 becomes larger. However, this design receives some criticism from Kagel and Roth 
(1992, p. 1388). They think it should be designed in a way that either the valuation distribution or the 
number of bidders is held constant.  
32 The reason for designing the tripled payoff experiments is to test whether multiplying the profit of a 
winning bid by any factor could have any effect on the equilibrium bid. The result for the experiment shows 
that there is no impact on bids, which is consistent with the CRRA model. However, Kagel (1995, p. 527) 
suggests that the experiments require substantial adjustments in order to provide a more demanding test.   
60 
 
Table 2.3.1 Details of first-price experiment data 
Paper Series Sessions [𝑣, 𝑣]  # Rounds #Observations 
      
CRS (1982) 1(3) 
dfd10'; dfd10x; dfd3 
[0.1, 4.9] 
10 90 
fdf10; fdf3' 20 120 
      
CSW(1985) 1'(3) 
fpn3(1); fpn3(2) 
[0, 6.0] 20 300 
fpn3(1)x,… fpn3(3)x 
    
  
 




fdf8; fdf8'x 20 160 







fdf8'x* 20 80 
      
CSW(1985) 
4(4) fplonci1,… fplonci10 [0, 10.0] 25 1000 





fp1nt1(2)x; fp1nt1(3)x 20 160 
   
  
 
10(4) fpbasei(1),… fpbasei(3) [0, 10.0] 25 300 
     
11(4) fpbnt(1)x,… fpbnt(3)x [0, 10.0] 20 240 
      




fdf9'; fdf9x 20 200 







fdf9'* 20 100 
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fdf2'; fdf4' 20 240 
    
  
 




fdf5' 20 180 
Note: This table is compiled from Table 1 in CRS (1982) and CSW (1988), respectively. The letter 
‘X’ represents the sessions with experienced subjects; * indicates the sessions with tripled payoffs. 




2.4.1 Treatment Effect  
 
It is noticed that apart from the differences in market size and payoff structure, another 
major disparity between the experiments that needs to be considered is the availability of 
information about private values in future rounds. In CRS (1982) experiment, each 
subject knew in advance their private values for all 10 rounds of a given first-price auction 
segment. Therefore, in this section, we analyse whether this design would have any 
influence on bidding behaviour. For simplicity, we refer to the CRS (1982) experiment 
as the ‘Knowledge treatment’, and the CSW (1985) experiment as the ‘No-Knowledge 
treatment’.33 We consider the two treatments, as well as the two different market sizes (3-
bidder and 4-bidder) as a 2 X 2 full-factorial design.34 We summarise the experimental 
design in Table 2.4.1. There are two treatments: ‘No-Knowledge’ versus ‘Knowledge’ 
                                                          
33 CSW (1983) also conducted the Knowledge treatment, however it gave the subjects tripled payoff instead. 
Therefore, we do not analyse CSW (1983) in this section.    
34 One limitation of the between-subject design is that we cannot control for the individual differences.  
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(with ‘No-Knowledge’ treated as the ‘control’); and ‘n=3’ versus ‘n=4’ (with ‘n=3’ 
treated as the ‘control’).  
 
Table 2.4.1 The No-Knowledge treatment and Knowledge treatment 
  n=3 n=4 
No-Knowledge 2 sessions; 6 subjects 10 sessions; 40 subjects 
Knowledge 4 sessions; 12 subjects 2 sessions; 8 subjects 
Note:  We remove the sessions with experienced bidders.  
 
Figure 2.4.1 illustrates the actual bids and risk neutral Nash equilibrium (RNNE) bid 
predictions for the above four treatments, and we find that most bids fall into the risk 
aversion Nash Equilibrium domain.35 At the same time, in the 3-bidder market, the bids 
are lower in the Knowledge treatment relative to the No-Knowledge treatment, on 
average. As can be seen from the top panel of the 3-bidder Knowledge treatment, 78 out 
of 180 observations (43.3%) are below the RNNE prediction. However, such a difference 
is not significant in the 4-bidder market.    
 
                                                          
35 In the n=4 No-Knowledge treatment, 34 out of 1000 bids are above the 45 line, which is irrational since 
this could result in loss if they are the winning bids. CSW (1988, p. 78) describe this behaviour pattern as 





Figure 2.4.1 Bids and private values in the Knowledge and No-Knowledge treatments 
for N=3 and N=4  
 
After removing 34 zero bid observations, we estimate an econometric model to test the 
effect of the Knowledge treatment on bids while holding other relevant factors constant. 
Note that in the corresponding experimental between-subject design the treatment 
variables are constant across auction rounds. Therefore, a pooled OLS model is employed.  
To control for market size effects, the model includes a dummy variable for market size 
as well as interaction terms with the main treatment variable and the private value. We 
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𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑖 + 𝛽3(𝑝𝑣𝑖𝑡  ×  𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑖) +
𝛽4𝑀𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖+𝛽5(𝑝𝑣𝑖𝑡  ×  𝑀𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖) + 𝛽6(𝑝𝑣𝑖𝑡  ×  𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑖 ×  𝑀𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
(2.4.1) 
 
where the dependent variable  𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡 denotes the bid of subject 𝑖  submitted at auction 
round  𝑡 . A dummy variable for the treatment variable is included as independent 
variable 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑖, which equals 1 if the observation belongs to the Knowledge treatment 
and 0 if it belongs to the No-Knowledge treatment. 𝑀𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 is also a dummy variable, 
which equals 1 if the observation takes place in a 4-bidder market and 0 if it takes place 
in a 3-bidder market. Since in the No-Knowledge treatment, each bidder can bid up to 𝑣 
instead of his private value 𝑝𝑣𝑖𝑡, we discard the bid observations where the bid exceeds 
the private value. In addition, we also normalise the bids and private values on the unit 
interval.36  Column (1) in Table 2.4.2 presents the regression coefficients.  
As recorded in the first and second rows of column (1) in Table 2.4.2, for the baseline 
No-Knowledge treatment in the 3-bidder market, the estimated intercept is insignificant, 
which accords with the CRRA prediction. However, the slope coefficient 0.798 is 
significantly above the RNNE prediction (0.667), which suggests that the bidders are risk 
averse on average. Table 2.4.2 also reveals that both 𝛽2 and 𝛽4 are insignificant, which 
indicates that the different treatments (No-Knowledge versus Knowledge, and n=3 versus 
n=4) do not influence the intercept term. At the same time, the differences in the slopes 
are both significant. In the 3-bidder market, the estimated slope in the Knowledge 
treatment is reduced by 0.145 relative to the No-Knowledge treatment (𝛽3), thus results 
to the estimated slope is 0.653, which does not violate the RNNE prediction. In 
addition, 𝛽5 is significantly positive, which shows that in terms of the No-Knowledge 
                                                          









treatment, the bidders submit higher bids in the 4-bidder market on average compared to 
the counterpart 3-bidder market, and this fits our prediction.  
The bidding behaviour for the Knowledge treatment in the 4-bidder market needs to be 
checked as well. As we can see from Table 2.4.2, 𝛽6, the interaction slope term of the two 
dummy variables is qualitatively close to 𝛽3. This suggests that the negative impact of the 
Knowledge treatment on the bids is offset by the market size increasing.   
Result 1: In the 3-bidder market, the bids are lower in the Knowledge treatment relative 
to the No-Knowledge treatment, on average. However, such a difference does not exist 
in the 4-bidder market. 
Such results are also in accordance with CRS (1982, p. 25) in that noncooperative 
behaviour fails to apply in the Knowledge treatment where n=3. Furthermore, we use 
piecewise linear regression technique to provide some insights of how the Knowledge 
treatment influences bids on different private value ranges in the 3-bidder market. 
Column (2) in Table 2.4.2 reports the results. In the piecewise linear estimation, we 
separate the normalized private values into four equal segments: 
[0, 0.25), [0.25, 0.5), [0.5, 0.75), and [0.75, 1]. We find that, the Knowledge treatment 
pushes down the bids for all four value ranges. However, only in range [0.5, 0.75) is the 
coefficient significant (-0.357), which results in a much lower fraction of private value 
0.587 in the corresponding private value range compared with the No-Knowledge 
treatment (0.944). Therefore, we have the following result 
Result 2: In the 3-bidder market, bidders submit significantly lower bids when they 
receive median private values in the Knowledge treatment relative to the No-Knowledge 





Table 2.4.2 Pooled OLS regression for the observed bids 
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# Observations   1386     300 
 
Note: Column (1) reports the regression results for equation (2.4.1). Column (2) reports 
the piecewise linear regression results for the 3-bidder market. Robust standard errors are 
shown in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’, and ‘4’ represent 
the private value range [0, 0.25), [0.25, 0.5), [0.5, 0.75), and [0.75, 1] respectively. 








2.4.2 Efficiency in different treatments 
  
After identifying the treatment effect, we check whether different treatments as well as 
different market sizes would have any impact on the efficiency of allocations.  
An auction is efficient if the object has been given to the bidder who values it the most. 
The efficiency of an auction can be measured as the ratio of the winner’s value to the 
highest value drawn among the bidders. 
  
Table 2.4.3 Mean efficiency by treatment and number of bidders 
N Paper Treatment # Auction # Obs. Efficiency 
3 
CRS(1982) Knowledge 70   77 96.2% (97.61%) 
CSW(1985) No-Knowledge 100   100 99.10% 
4 
CRS(1982) Knowledge 60   66 98.8% (99.62%) 
CSW(1983) Knowledge, Tripled 30   36 98.80% 
CSW(1985) No-Knowledge 437   439 98.60% 
5 
CRS(1982) Knowledge 60   64 99.5% (99.80%) 
CSW(1983) Knowledge, Tripled 30   31 98.50% 
6 CRS(1982) Knowledge 60   63 98.5% (98.26%) 
9 CRS(1982) Knowledge 30   33 99.6% (99.77%) 
Note: For each combination of treatment and market size, we combine all the associated 
auctions and observations to compute the mean allocation efficiency. For the rows where 
‘# Obs’ outweighs ‘# Auction’, more than one bidder submitted the highest bid in the 
corresponding auctions. The numbers in parentheses indicate the mean efficiency as 




In Table 2.4.3, we report the mean efficiency by treatment and number of bidders. CRS 
(1982, p. 28) also report the mean efficiency for the CRS (1982) experiments (as shown 
in parentheses in the last column of Table 2.4.3). There are some differences between our 
results and the efficiencies reported by CRS (1982). This is because for some auction 
rounds, more than one bidder submitted the highest bid and only CRS (1982) know which 
bidder was selected as the winner. However, in this section, we extend the efficiency 
calculation by incorporating CSW (1983) and CSW (1985) experiments and thus provide 
a full picture of the allocation efficiency in different treatments. It is observed that the 
efficiencies are quite high in all the experiments (except that the efficiency of the 
Knowledge treatment in the 3-bidder market is slightly lower).     
 
2.4.3 Heterogeneous risk preferences  
 








for 𝑏𝑖 ≤ 𝑏
∗ =
𝑛 − 1




Where 𝑏∗is the maximum bid for the least risk averse bidder in the population.37 The part 
of the equilibrium bid function for 𝑏𝑖 > 𝑏
∗  has no closed form. Equation (2.4.2)  is 
dependent on the risk attitude of bidder 𝑖 but not of his rivals. 
                                                          
37 We have normalized the private values in the unit interval. 
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The CRRA model assumes that bidders behave as if a certain distribution over risk 
attitudes is commonly known by them, as in CSW (1988, p. 75) and Walker, Smith and 
Cox (1990, p. 12). These papers set 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1; put it another way, the bidders share the 
belief that the least risk averse bidder is risk neutral. In this section, we relax this 
assumption so that risk-loving bidders exist in the population, and set 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 2 .
38 
Therefore, we can estimate each bidder’s risk preference parameter 𝑟𝑖 within these two 
assumptions.  
Harrison (1990) notices an issue with testing the CRRA model, which is that laboratory 
experiments generally do not control for the bidders’ risk attitudes. Therefore, he uses the 
first-price auctions dataset from CRS (1982) and CSW (1983) and constructs four explicit 
Bayesian prior distributions for the risk attitudes. Harrison identifies that, if the risk-
loving propensity is ignored and 100 values for  𝑟𝑖 (from 0.01 to 1.00) are used to generate 
the explicit prior, the winning bids are consistent with the risk neutral Nash predictions.  
However, when one allows risk-loving bidders, they are inconsistent with the Nash 
predictions. Overall, there are two major differences between Harrison (1990) and this 
chapter. Firstly, after assuming the prior distribution, the method employed by Harrison 
is to generate the predicted winning prices using equation (2.4.2), and compare them with 
the realised winning price. In this chapter, we use the realised bids, not only the winning 
bids, to back out  𝑟𝑖  using equation (2.4.2) and to compare how changing 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥  would 
influence 𝑟𝑖  and the corresponding underlying distributions. Secondly, with regards to 
allowing for risk-loving bidders, Harrison does not confine 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥, whereas in this chapter 
we set 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 2.  
                                                          
38 Referring to Chapter 1, 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 2 is already in the range of highly risk loving. Therefore, setting such a 
prior belief for the least risk averse bidder is sufficient and we do not need to raise the assumption of 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥  
to an even higher value. 
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We analyse each bidder’s bidding behaviour by estimating the following linear equation 
 𝑏𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑣𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖 (2.4.4) 
 
Where 𝑏𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖 are normalised to the unit interval, and 𝑒𝑖 is a random error term with 
mean zero. This linear equation is only valid for the observations which satisfy equation 
(2.4.3).39 For a given number of bidders, 𝑏∗ is inversely related to 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 , so that there 
would be fewer valid observations as 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 increases. From the CRRA model we have the 
prediction that 𝛼𝑖 = 0  and 𝛽𝑖 =
𝑛−1
𝑛−1+𝑟𝑖
. When estimating bidder  𝑖 ’s coefficient pair 
(𝛼?̂?, 𝛽?̂?), if 𝛼?̂? is significantly different from zero (either positive or negative), then bidder 
𝑖’s bidding behaviour is inconsistent with the CRRA model. Otherwise, CRRA model 
implies that   
 𝑟?̂? =






We discard from the analysis the few sessions that involve subjects with experience from 
previous auction experiments, and also discard the few sessions with tripled payoffs.40 
The data we use constitutes a total of 2500 observations, spread over 29 sessions and a 
summary of the regression estimates (𝛼?̂?, 𝛽?̂?) for Equation (2.4.4) are reported in Table 
2.4.4.
                                                          
39 CSW (1988, p.75); Walker, Smith, and Cox (1990, p.12); Cox, Smith, and Walker (1992, p. 1400), and 
Pezanis-Christou and Romeu (2002, p.13) used a more demanding iterative method to truncate the 





40 As mentioned in footnote 3 of Harrison (1990), there is some behavioural evidence that the experienced 




   Table 2.4.4 Summary of regressions estimates of  𝛼?̂?, 𝛽?̂? in the cases of 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1 and 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 2 
 
          𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1   𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 2 
   # Total # Obs  𝛼?̂? ≠ 0 
a  # Obs  𝛼?̂? ≠ 0 
b 
N Treatment # Subjects. Auctions (Percent) 𝛼?̂? > 0  𝛼?̂? < 0  Total (Percent) 𝛼?̂? > 0  𝛼?̂? < 0  Total 
3 
Knowledge 12 180  151 (83.89) 0 0 0
c1  125 (69.44) 0 0 0
c1 
             
No-Knowledge 6 120  103 (85.83) 0 1 1  80 (66.67) 0 1 1 
              
4 
Knowledge 8 120  99 (82.50) 0 3 3  82 (68.33) 0 3 3 
             
No-Knowledge 52 1300  1076 (82.77) 8 3 11  836 (64.31) 2 5 7
c2 
              
5 Knowledge 10 150  120 (80.00) 0 3 3  93 (62.00) 0 1 1 
              
6 Knowledge 24 360  315 (87.50) 0 3 3  284 (78.89) 0 2 2 
              
9 Knowledge 18 270  243 (90.00) 0 8 8  222 (82.22) 0 10 10 
              
Total   130 2500   2107 (84.28) 8 21 29   1722 (68.88) 2 22 24 
Note: a, b: Number of subjects where 𝛼?̂? is significantly different from zero at the 5% level. c1 (c2): In the corresponding treatments, two 
subjects’ (one subject’s) 𝛽?̂? are (is) not significantly different from zero at the 5% level, which is also inconsistent with the CRRA model. The 
estimation results are obtained after normalizing the bid and private value observations at unit interval. The regressions do not include those 




, the nonlinear domain of the normalized bid function; and do not include observations where 
𝑏𝑖 = 0 or 𝑏𝑖 ≥ 𝑣𝑖. 
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According to Table 2.4.4, across all the sessions, we remove 15.72% of observations 
before estimating equation (2.4.4) in the case of 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1; whereas when  𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 2 we 
have to delete 31.12% of observations.41 This accords with what we explain above: there 
are fewer observations as 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 increases. In the two cases where  𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1 and 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 2, 
there are 29 subjects (22.31%) and 24 subjects (18.46%) respectively, whose bidding 
behaviour is inconsistent with the CRRA model, with the subjects’ intercepts being 
significantly different from zero. More specifically, the intercepts show a strong tendency 
to be negative. In CSW (1988, p. 75) Table 4, they report the regression results for 156 
subjects (which includes 33 experienced subjects) in the case of 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1. They find a 
similar result that 21.8% of subjects’ intercepts are significantly different from zero.  
Table 2.4.5 shows the means, standard deviations and the medians of the estimated risk 
parameter 𝑟 in each treatment. We can observe that, regardless of the  𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 assumption, 
the subjects are risk averse on average, except in the Knowledge treatment with a 3-bidder 
market. This result is also in accordance with CSW (1988, pp. 72-73). However, as we 
discuss in Section 2.4.1, this discrepancy may be due to the treatment effect rather than 
the subjects having risk-loving tendencies. The estimates also suggest heterogeneity 
across subjects in terms of risk aversion, which is consistent with CSW (1988). For the 
estimated risk parameter for each subject, please see the results in Appendix C. 
From the last row of Table 2.4.5, we find that the pooled means for the risk parameter for 
𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1 and 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 2 are quite close: 0.567 and 0.598, respectively. It is instructive to 
compare the results reported by Harrison (1990, p. 543), which elicits risk attitudes using 
the Becker-DeGroot-Marshak (BDM) procedure. He computes the pooled means of risk 
                                                          




 results in deleting fewer 
observations than we do in this chapter, such as in Walker, Smith, and Cox (1990), who remove 5.7% of 
observations in the 4-bidder market; and in Pezanis-Christou and Romeu (2002), who remove 3% of 
observations in the 3-bidder and 5-bidder markets. 
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coefficients by varying  𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 . One scenario is to set  𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1 ; the other scenario is 
allowing risk loving preferences 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 > 0 while not giving a specific number for 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥. 
The pooled means are 0.698 and 1.051, respectively. Combining Harrison’s finding as 
well as our results, changing the prior distribution of the risk parameter by varying 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥, 
indeed change the estimated risk parameters for the subjects.     
Besides eliciting the estimated risk parameter for each individual, we are also interested 
in the distribution of the risk parameters in the two cases  𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1  and  𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 2 . 
Therefore, we calculate the mean risk parameter in each session and obtain 29 
independent observation pairs (𝑟1, 𝑟2) which we use to conduct the Wilcoxon signed rank 
test. The null hypothesis 𝐻0 of the test is that 𝑟1 and 𝑟2 are from populations with the 
same distribution. The p-value (0.105) shows that we cannot reject 𝐻0. Therefore, the two 
distributions of the risk parameters under the two conditions  𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1 and 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 2 are 
not significantly different.   
Result 3: Changing the prior distribution of the risk parameter by varying 𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒙  from 
1 to 2 indeed changes the estimated individual risk parameters. However, the two 




Table 2.4.5 The statistics of mean and median risk preference parameters in each treatment  
        𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1   𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 2 
  # Total  # Subjects 𝑟𝑖   # Subjects 𝑟𝑖   
N Treatment   Subjects    (Percent) Mean S.D. Median   (Percent) Mean S.D. Median 
3 
Knowledge 12  10 (83.33)
  1.13 0.546 1.03  10 (83.33)
  1.3 0.579 1.1 
            
No-Knowledge 6  5 (83.33) 0.41 0.195 0.29  5 (83.33) 0.52 0.289 0.61 
             
4 
Knowledge 8  5 (62.5) 0.26 0.071 0.29  5 (62.5) 0.30 0.069 0.29 
            
No-Knowledge 52  41 (78.85) 0.48 0.576 0.33  44 (84.62)
  0.52 0.755 0.26 
             
5 Knowledge 10  7 (70) 0.41 0.109 0.37  9 (90) 0.28 0.355 0.32 
             
6 Knowledge 24  21 (87.5) 0.75 0.600 0.64  22 (91.67) 0.83 0.776 0.58 
             
9 Knowledge 18  10 (55.56) 0.31 0.191 0.29  8 (44.44) 0.25 0.180 0.29 
             
Total   130   99 (76.15) 0.567 0.552 0.367   103 (79.23) 0.598 0.706 0.405 




Table 2.4.6 The mean of the risk parameter for each session in the cases of 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1 
and 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 2  
N Treatment Sessions  𝑟1 𝑟2 
3 
Knowledge 
dfd10' 0.820 1.080 
fdf10 0.810 0.850 
dfd3 2.338 2.338 





fpn3(1) 0.500 0.610 
fpn3(2) 0.270 0.380 





dfd8' 0.250 0.316 





fplonci1 0.332 0.330 
fplonci2 0.517 0.103 
fplonci3 0.525 0.554 
fplonci4 1.119 1.018 
fplonci5 0.255 0.097 
fplonci6 0.688 0.804 
fplonci7 0.226 0.310 
fplonci8 0.744 1.084 
fplonci9 0.300 0.363 
fplonci10 0.382 0.500 
fpbasei(1) 0.296 0.470 
fpbasei(2) 0.646 0.696 
fpbasei(3) 0.242 0.248 




dfd9 0.361 0.192 
fdf9' 0.474 0.395 




dfd2ri 1.119 1.199 
dfd4 0.686 0.759 
fdf2' 0.417 0.349 
fdf4' 0.779 0.818 




dfd5 0.389 0.285 
fdf5' 0.224 0.182 
Note: The columns of  𝑟1 and  𝑟2 are obtained by taking the average estimated risk 
parameters for each subject in the corresponding session with the conditions of 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1  
and  𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 2 , respectively. 
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Besides the statistical test, in order to graphically present the distributions across different 
treatments and market sizes, we also plot the probability density estimates of 𝑟1 (with a 
red line) and 𝑟2  (with a blue line) in Figure 2.4.2. For the sake of comparing the 
distributions in the same scale, we have controlled the range of the x-axis in the range of 
[0, 2] and the y-axis in the range of [0, 4]. It is obvious that the two unimodal distributions 
in the Knowledge treatment with 3-bidder are quite different from the other six 
experiments, as we can see that the local maximum values are in the range of risk neutral 
or risk loving instead of risk averse. At the same time, the shapes of the distributions of 𝑟1 
and 𝑟2 for the remaining graphs are basically all positively skewed, which shows that the 
mass of the risk parameter distribution is concentrated to the left of the figure (indicating 
risk aversion).  
After discussing the relationship between the distributions of  𝑟1 and 𝑟2, we address 
another question – is the distribution of the estimated risk parameters the same across 
different market sizes? To do so, we use the mean values for each session shown in Table 
2.4.6 again for the Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test. The null 
hypothesis  𝐻0  of the test is that the 𝑘  independent samples come from the same 
distribution. As previously examined, the subjects in the Knowledge treatment with a 3-
bidder market on average are not risk averse, which is different from the other six 
experiments. Therefore, we remove the corresponding mean values. The results show that 
no matter whether we use 𝑟1 or 𝑟2, we cannot reject that the risk parameters are from the 
same distribution (p-value =0.221and 0.167, respectively). It is instructive to look at a 
similar result reported by Chen and Plott (1998). They show that the risk parameters 
estimated from five of the six sessions’ first-price auctions with non-uniformly distributed 
private values are also drawn from the same distribution.  
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Result 4: In the CRS (1982) and CSW (1985) experiments with 3, 4, 5, 6, and 9 bidders, 
the subjects have heterogeneous risk aversion parameters. However, the distributions 
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 𝑟2 
Figure 2.4.2 Probability density estimation with the assumptions 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1 and 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
2  for different market sizes and treatments 
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2.4.4 Heterogeneous loss attitudes 
 
In this section, we analyse loss aversion attitudes, in terms of its importance in economics 
and particularly in relation to decision-making under uncertainty, which is second only 
to risk aversion attitudes. It will provide us with a full picture of the subjects’ parameters 
relating to payoff uncertainty. We first describe the data, and then as in Chapter 1 we use 
an interval regression technique to estimate each subject’s loss aversion coefficient based 
on the data. The last step is comparing the distributions of the loss aversion coefficients 
between the independent samples we have obtained.  
The data we use are from two identical lottery experiments aiming to elicit subjects’ loss 
attitudes. The two experiments include 144 and 60 subjects, respectively. Both 
experiments were conducted at the Adelaide Laboratory for Experimental Economics 
(Adlab). One was conducted in 2014, which is from the lottery stage of the working paper 
-"Loss aversion and regret in common value auctions" by Pezanis-Christou and Wu 
(2014); the other was conducted in 2016.42 The design of the 14 lotteries used in the two 
experiments is shown in Table 1.3.1 in Chapter 1.   
 
 
                                                          




Note: As in Chapter 1, for the 2014 experiment we also analyse the first switch point for 
the 21 subjects who have more than one switch points.  




We first draw histograms of the number of accepted lotteries for the 2014 and 2016 
experiments in Figure 2.4.3.  As can be seen, for the 2014 experiment, the distribution of 
the number of accepted lotteries is unimodal and negatively skewed. There is a clear mode 
and also a most frequent number of accepted lotteries - 10 lotteries, which represents the 
lotteries with nonnegative expected payoffs. At the same time, the corresponding shape 
of the distribution in the 2016 experiment is a multimodal distribution with 4, 6, and 10 
lotteries as local maximums.        
Next, after pooling the observations from the two experiments, we use the interval 
regression method as in Chapter 1 to elicit each subject’s loss aversion parameter. We 
report the estimated loss aversion coefficient by number of accepted lotteries in Table 
2.4.7. 43 The subjects most frequently accepted lotteries #1 to #10 (20.59%).  From the 
fourth column (cumulative percentage) we can find that the median subject of the 204 
                                                          
43 Due to the number of subjects available for analysis expanding to 204, the estimated loss aversion 
parameters 𝜆 for the corresponding number of accepted lotteries: 1, 2, 4 and 13 are slightly different from 
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subjects accepts lotteries #1 to #8, which implies that the median value of 𝜆 is 1.36.  This 
suggests that loss aversion is a significant pattern for the subjects.       
Table 2.4.7 The estimated loss aversion parameter for the corresponding number of 
accepted lotteries 
  # Accepted # Subjects Percentage Cum.  [𝜆𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥] 𝜆    
  Lotteries   (%) percentage (%)       
 0 5 2.45 1.20 (19, ∞) 19.61  
 1 4 1.96 4.41 (9, 19] 10.22  
 2 8 3.92 8.33 (5.67, 9] 6.94  
 3 4 1.96 10.29 (4, 5.67] 4.78  
 4 19 9.31 19.61 (3, 4] 3.49  
 5 7 3.43 23.04 (2.33, 3] 2.66  
 6 26 12.75 35.78 (1.86, 2.33] 2.10  
 7 20 9.80 45.59 (1.5, 1.86] 1.68  
 8 25 12.25 57.84 (1.22, 1.5] 1.36  
 9 26 12.75 70.59 (1, 1.22] 1.11  
 10 42 20.59 91.18 (0.82, 1] 0.91  
 11 6 2.94 94.12 (0.67, 0.82] 0.75  
 12 4 1.96 96.08 (0.54, 0.67] 0.61  
 13 1 0.49 96.57 (0.43, 0.54] 0.49  
  14 7 3.43 100.00 (0, 0.43] 0.22   
Note: ‘Cum. Percentage’ represents the cumulative percentage.  
 
 
Table 2.4.8 shows the mean and the median of the estimated loss aversion parameter 𝜆 in 
the two experiments. We can find that the corresponding statistics are very similar. Such 
a result is also verified by a Wilcoxon rank-sum test, which is used to test whether two 
independent groups are drawn from the same distribution. The p-value = 0.255 represents 
that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two distributions of loss aversion 
parameters from the 2014 and 2016 experiments are drawn from the same distribution. 
Figure 2.4.4 also graphically illustrates the two distributions.44 The two distributions are 
both positively skewed.    
                                                          
44 For the sake of consistency, we drop 5 extreme loss aversion coefficients (𝜆 = 19.61) while drawing the 
probability density distribution for the 2014 experiment.  
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Result 5: Subjects have heterogeneous loss aversion parameters, but the distributions 




Table 2.4.8 The description of loss aversion parameters in two experiments 
 
Experiment # Subjects Mean S.D. Median 
2014 144 2.48 3.66 1.36 
2016 60 2.31 2.10 1.68 







        Experiment 2014 
       Experiment 2016 
 
 
Figure 2.4.4 Probability density distributions for the estimated loss aversion parameters 
in the two experiments










           
 2.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we re-examine a large amount of first-price independent private value 
auction experimental data published by CRS (1982), CSW (1983 & 1985). Treatment 
effect, which is a long time overlooked issue in the CRS (1982) experiment design has 
been identified. We find that in the 3-bidder market, the bidders bid less in this special 
first-price auction compared to the standard first-price auction; whereas such a difference 
is not significant in the 4-bidder market. 
We also estimate heterogeneous constant relative risk aversion parameters under two 
assumptions:  𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1 and 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 2 . The results, on the one hand, confirm that there 
are heterogeneous risk aversion attitudes; on the other hand, also illustrate that the 
distribution of the risk attitudes is not influenced by whether we incorporate the 
possibility of risk-loving or not, and is also stable across the 3, 4, 5, 6, and 9 market sizes. 
This demonstrates the CRRA model is quite robust. In addition, we also find that the 





Chapter 3: Bidding behaviour in sequential first-price auctions with 
and without penalty: A re-examination 
 
 3.1 Introduction 
 
In real-world auction markets, sellers sometimes need to sell two or more identical or 
non-identical objects. In multi-unit auctions, many options are open to the seller. First of 
all, the seller must decide whether to sell the objects jointly together in a single round or 
separately in a sequence of stages. Based on this difference, simultaneous auctions and 
sequential auctions are two general settings for multi-unit auctions. A dramatic difference 
between the two auction formats is the availability of information. In sequential auctions, 
normally the winning bid for each unit is revealed, whereas such information is unknown 
in simultaneous auctions.   
The Shanghai license plate market, for instance, adopts the simultaneous auction format. 
At the same time, in another market in China - Kunming International Flower Auction 
market (KIFA), flowers are sold in sequential auctions with a Dutch auction format. Some 
other objects are also sold in a sequential auction setting such as - cattle, fish, vegetables, 
timber, tobacco, and wine. Besides this, in the financial market, sequential auctions are 
used by the government to privatise state-owned enterprises through selling the shares of 
Initial Public Offerings (IPO). Since sequential auctions are widely used in the field, we 
choose such an auction setting to study in this chapter.  
Weber (1981) provides a theoretical benchmark model for sequential, independent private 
value auctions with single-unit demand risk-neutral bidders. He rigorously establishes 
that the sequence of prices in a sequential first-price or second-price auction is a 
‘martingale’- prices remain constant over time. Intuitively, on the one hand, the number 




increasing price trend; on the other hand, fewer bidders still remain active in the market, 
which induces a decreasing price trend. These two effects offset each other. However, 
when relating the theoretical model to the field, a ‘declining price anomaly’ 45 
phenomenon, first described by Ashenfelter (1989), has been widely observed. 46  He 
studies the price patterns in a sequential English auction market for wine and finds that 
instead of the ‘law of one price’, actually the chance of the price decreasing is at least 
twice as great as the price increasing.  
Ashenfelter (1989) informally proposes that risk aversion plays a significant role in real 
auction markets and may contribute to the anomaly. Nonetheless, McAfee and Vincent 
(1993) using a two-stage first-price and second-price auction model show that only by 
assuming the bidder displays a non-decreasing absolute risk aversion (NDARA), a 
symmetric increasing pure equilibrium bidding strategy could exist, and hence lead to the 
price declining. However, such an assumption is empirically implausible in reality since 
there appears to be a consensus that bidders display a decreasing absolute risk aversion.  
In the same vein, Mezzetti (2011), and Hu and Zou (2015) both explore the ‘declining 
price anomaly’ from the view of risk attitudes. The former one assumes such an anomaly 
stems from an aversion to price risk; while the latter one formulates a general log-
supermodular model to explain the anomaly. So far, there have been several other 
attempts to explain the ‘declining price anomaly’. For instance, Black and De Meza (1992) 
show through a two period second-price model that the price declines under a buyer’s 
                                                          
45 This is also known as the ‘afternoon effect’. 
46 Actually, the first empirical paper to investigate the price declining phenomenon is Buccola (1982), 
which reports such a finding in the livestock market. However, this paper does not use the term ‘declining 




option that allows the winner of the first item to buy the subsequent items at the same 
price.  
Another strand of the literature that seeks to explain the phenomenon is supply uncertainty. 
Jeitschko (1999) considers a framework in sequential second-price auctions with two 
arrivals of information about supply during the course of a sequence. He finds that if the 
number of items for sale is larger than the number that bidders expect, prices would 
decline. Neugebauer and Pezanis-Christou (2007) introduce supply uncertainty in 
Weber’s benchmark model for sequential first-price auctions; they show that the greater 
the uncertainty, the more the expected price declines. More recently, Rosato (2014) 
argued that reference-dependent preferences and loss aversion can rationalise the price 
declining phenomenon. He analyses two-stage first-price and second-price auction 
models, and shows that the higher the winning bid in the first stage, the less aggressive 
the bidding behaviour in the second stage. He concludes that this is because the bids are 
history-dependent and subject to a ‘discouragement effect’ in the second stage.   
However, this chapter does not aim to find the reason behind the ‘declining price 
anomaly’. Instead, we analyse an early stage laboratory experiment of sequential auctions 
conducted by Keser and Olson (1996).47 Their paper contains important insights about 
the effect of bidders acting as agents in sequential auctions, which is inspired by Milgrom 
and Weber (1982) who suggest that the use of agents may result in declining prices. There 
are three treatments of sequential first-price auctions in their paper, which are benchmark, 
penalty, and agent treatment respectively. The benchmark treatment is a standard 
                                                          
47 Other experiments were conducted before Keser and Olson (1996). Burns (1985) considers a sequential 
English auction of professional wool buyers and students. Dorsey (1989) conducts a sequential auction in 
a laboratory setting after a single period first-price auction. Both of them find a declining price anomaly; 





sequential first-price auction. In both the penalty and the agent treatments, the bidders act 
as agents which is realised by imposing a penalty on the bidders who fail to acquire items. 
The only difference between these two treatments is that the penalty treatment allows bids 
greater than private values, whereas the agent treatment prohibits this. The design of the 
penalty is not just for reflecting a real-world auction situation. Moreover, it presents an 
implicit penalty borne by the bidders who lose the auctions.48  
Therefore, the interest is on the bidders’ behaviour when they face a monetary loss and 
how that would influence the seller’s revenue. Previous experimental work has shown 
that losing and winning are generally not treated symmetrically by subjects. However, in 
the standard auction context, losing the auction does not involve any monetary loss. 
Therefore, in addition to the payback scheme analysed in Chapter 1, which involves 
subjects receiving an initial capital balance in a single-unit first-price auction and 
subsequently having to ‘pay it back’ if they lose, we also examine the penalties the losers 
must pay in the sequential first-price auction experiments conducted by Keser and Olson 
(1996). As a result, we gain a better understanding of how the bidders would behave in 
the auction setting with monetary loss and to check whether this accords with what the 
model predicts. 
Besides presenting a risk neutral Nash equilibrium model without a strict argumentation, 
Keser and Olson (1996) also report some results of the penalty treatment. Firstly, they   
identify a declining price anomaly. Secondly, they compute an overall 98% allocation 
efficiency without taking the different auction stages into consideration. Thirdly, they 
estimate the bidding behaviour with respect to private value for each unit using linear and 
                                                          





quadratic functions and find that the slope coefficient is larger as the auction unravels 
which is as the model predicts.  
The supply certainty treatment reported by Neugebauer and Pezanis-Christou (2007) is 
closely related to Keser and Olson (1996). It includes a longer auction series – 100 rounds 
instead of 20 rounds. In addition, Neugebauer and Pezanis-Christou (2007) also report 
two supply uncertainty treatments. As mentioned earlier, they extend the theoretical 
model to incorporate such a supply uncertainty. Since this chapter does not analyse the 
supply uncertainty treatment, we only summarise the findings of the certainty treatment 
in Neugebauer and Pezanis-Christou (2007).  
With regard to prices, they find that the prices decline over the four stages for the first 20 
rounds but remain constant for the 100 rounds overall. Unlike Keser and Olson (1996), 
they measure the allocation efficiency in terms of the percentage of occasions where the 
unit is sold to the bidder, whose value ranking is lower than or equal to the order of the 
unit, which yields a 72% aggregate efficiency. They also suggest that in 100-round 
auction, the high value bidders have time to learn the benefit of a ‘wait and see’ strategy 
– that is, not bidding aggressively in the early stages while giving the low value bidders 
a chance to win these early units. The ‘wait and see’ strategy can be observed from the 
relatively low allocation efficiencies for the first two units in the certainty treatment.       
In this chapter, we adopt some methods used by Neugebauer and Pezanis-Christou (2007) 
to re-examine the experiments reported by Keser and Olson (1996). Our research question 
is whether a penalty would affect the auction market as predicted from the risk neutral 
Nash equilibrium (RNNE) model. To answer this question, it is necessary to separately 
look at five aspects: bidding strategy, price patterns, revenue, bid dependency, and 




are summarised as follows: first of all, instead of estimating linear and quadratic bid 
functions, we estimate a piecewise linear regression assuming four equal segments and 
find that the bidding behaviour is non-monotonic, although the RNNE prediction for the 
intermediate value bidders’ slope coefficient cannot be rejected.  
Secondly, we identify that the price-declining anomaly stems from the price of the first 
unit being higher than the other three units. Thirdly, with the penalty, the seller’s revenue 
indeed is greater than the no-penalty treatment as the model predicts. Fourthly, the bids 
depend not only on private values, but also on the price of the previous stage. Finally, by 
computing the allocation efficiency for each stage of the sequential auctions, we find a 
relative inefficiency for the first three units, which also suggests a ‘wait and see’ bidding 
strategy for the high value bidders. So overall, a penalty would affect the auction market 
differently from the RNNE prediction.  
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 introduces a penalty in 
the benchmark model and derives the theoretical framework. Section 3.3 describes the 
data. In Section 3.4, the analysis and results are reported. Section 3.5 concludes the 
















 3.2 Model  
 
Suppose there are 𝑛 risk-neutral bidders with single-unit demand competing for 𝑘 (𝑘 <
𝑛) units of item. The auction lasts for 𝑘 stages. In each stage, one unit is to be sold to the 
highest bidder, and the winning bid is publicly announced. All values are independently 
and identically drawn from a distribution 𝐹 with density 𝑓 defined on 𝑅+. Each bidder 
has private information about his private value. The other parameters 𝑛,  𝑘 and 𝐹  are 
common knowledge. An important feature of the scenario compared with the standard 
sequential auctions is that the bidders who have failed to purchase an item need to pay a 
penalty 𝑃. 
Consider bidder 1 with private value 𝑥 , and we define 1 2 1nY Y Y    as the order 
statistics of the remaining ( 1)n  other private values. Imagine we are at stage l , which 
implies that we have observed the price (winning bid) of stage 1,2,... 1l  . Under the 
assumption of a monotonic increasing bidding strategy in each auction stage, the bidders 
can infer the highest value of stage 𝑙 − 1, 1ly  . In addition, the conditional distribution of 
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Then we use backward induction to find out the symmetric bidding strategy in each 
auction stage, and so start from the last stage 𝑘. Suppose that all the bidders except for 
bidder 1 use the bidding strategy 𝑏𝑘(∙). Bidder 1’s expected profit from bidding 𝑏𝑘(∙) as 
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The first equation represents the expected profit when bidder 1 bids according to a value 
𝑧𝑘 smaller than the highest value of stage −1 ,𝑦𝑘−1. 𝑃 Stands for the penalty the bidder 
faces if fails to acquire any item. The second equation stands for the expected profit when 
bidder 1 bids as if he had a value greater than 𝑦𝑘−1 (which means greater than the values 
of all the remaining bidders). The first-order condition for profit maximization of truthful 
bidding requires 𝑏𝑘
′ (𝑧𝑘,𝑥; 𝑦1, 𝑦2 … 𝑦𝑘−1)|𝑧𝑘=𝑥 = 0 . For 𝑧𝑘 ≤ 𝑦𝑘−1 , the first-order 
condition is 
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yielding the following first-order differential equation below    
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The boundary condition of the differential equation in equation (3.2.1) is 
𝑏𝑘(0, 𝑦1, 𝑦2 … 𝑦𝑘−1) = 0   . Furthermore, for any 𝑥 ≤ 𝑦𝑘−1, as the right-hand side of the 
equation is independent of 𝑦1, 𝑦2 … 𝑦𝑘−1 , we have  𝑏𝑘(𝑥, 𝑦1, 𝑦2 … 𝑦𝑘−1) = 𝑏𝑘(𝑥) . For 
any  𝑥 > 𝑦𝑘−1 , we also have 𝑏𝑘(𝑥, 𝑦1, 𝑦2 … 𝑦𝑘−1) = 𝑏𝑘(𝑦𝑘−1) . The last stage 𝑘 




Next, we move to the second-to-last stage 𝑘 − 1. Bidder 1 knows that if he loses in 
stage 𝑘 − 1 he will surely play the equilibrium strategy in stage 𝑘. In stage 𝑘 − 1, bidder 
1’s expected profit takes the following expression 
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If 𝑧𝑘−1 ≤ 𝑦𝑘−2 , the first line stands for the expected profit if bidder 1 wins at stage 𝑘 −
1, whereas the second line represents the expected profit if he loses at stage  𝑘 − 1 and he 
bids in equilibrium in stage 𝑘 . On the other hand, by bidding 𝑧𝑘−1 > 𝑦𝑘−2 , he will 
certainly win. We note that the penalty P does not enter into the expected profit function 
for stage 𝑘 − 1, which is because even if bidder 1 loses at this stage, he still could win in 
the last stage. Therefore, the penalty P should only exist in the expected profit for the last 
stage 𝑘. The first-order condition for maximization of the bidder’s expected profit for 
stage 𝑘 − 1 also requires  
1
'
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condition is 
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As in stage  𝑘 , the equilibrium bidding strategy for stage  𝑘 − 1 is independent of 
1 2  2 , ky y y   for any 2 kx y  ; therefore we have 𝑏𝑘−1(𝑥, 𝑦1 , 𝑦2… 𝑦𝑘−2 ) = 𝑏𝑘−1(𝑥). For 
any 2 kx y  , we also have    1 1 2  2 1 2 , ,k k k kb x y y y b y     . The second-to-last stage 
𝑘 − 1 equilibrium strategy is thus a function defined through 𝑏𝑘−1(min{𝑥, 𝑦𝑘−2}). 
The equilibrium bidding strategies for the stage 𝑘 − 2, as well as the previous stages are 
determined in a similar way. To summarise, in each stage 𝑙 , the bidding strategy is 
 𝑏𝑙(min{𝑥, 𝑦𝑙−1}) , for 𝑙 = 1,2, … , 𝑘. Here, it is noted that for the first stage strategy, 
𝑦0 actually is the upper bound of the private values that the bidders do not need to infer. 
Besides this, the bidding strategy is monotonic increasing in private value. For all 𝑙, it 
should always have 𝑥 ≤ 𝑦𝑙−1. Therefore,  𝑏𝑙(min{𝑥, 𝑦𝑙−1}) =  𝑏𝑙(𝑥). . 
Having derived the risk neutral Nash equilibrium bidding strategy in each stage of the 
sequential auctions with penalty, we implement this rule to pin down the bidding strategy 
in the experiment conducted by Keser and Olson (1996).49 In this experiment, the private 
values are i.i.d drawn from [1, 1000].  
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Solving equation (3.2.1) for stage 𝑘 yields 
                                                          
49 Keser and Olson (1996) show the RNNE bidding strategy but not the derivation process. They state that 
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, we obtain 
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By moving backwards to stage 𝑘 − 1  to solve equation (3.2.2), we get 
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Proposition. Let k be the total number of items to be sold, and P the penalty that needs to 
be paid by the bidder who fails to obtain an item. For sequential first-price auctions with 
unit-demand and private value bidders, there exists a series (𝑏1, 𝑏2, … , 𝑏𝑘) of symmetric 
monotonically increasing equilibrium bidding strategies defined as 
 
𝑏𝑘−𝑙(𝑥) = 𝑃 +
𝑛 − 𝑘
𝑛 − (𝑘 − 𝑙) + 1
(𝑥 − 1) + 1, 
 






In equilibrium, the expected price for each stage 𝑘 − 𝑙, 𝑙 = 0, 1, 2, … , 𝑘 − 1 is determined 
by evaluating the corresponding Nash equilibrium bidding strategy at the expected 




999 , for 𝑙 = 0, 1, 2, … , 𝑘 − 1. Hence, the seller’s expected price for each stage 𝑘 − 𝑙, 𝑙 =
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𝑛 − 𝑘 + 𝑙 + 1
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Therefore, to compute the revenue in sequential auctions, we only need to sum the prices   
for all four stages, which is given by: 











In Keser and Olson’s (1996) experiment, 𝑛 = 8, 𝑘 = 4, and 𝑃 = 100. We substitute the 
corresponding parameters in equation (3.2.3) − (3.2.5),  and then summarise the 
predicted results in Table 3.2.1.  
 
Table 3.2.1 RNNE predicted bidding strategy and price for each stage and revenues for 
both treatments    
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From Table 3.2.1, with a penalty the bidders are worse off since for each stage, as their 
bids increase by exactly as much as the penalty P=100. At the same time, the auction 
seller is better off since he gets an extra 400 from the four winners in the sequential 
auctions.  
 
 3.3 Data description 
 
The data used in this chapter is from Keser and Olson (1996). The aim of their research 
is to conduct a series of experiments to analyse the declining price phenomenon in 
sequential auctions. They conduct two novel treatments where the bidders act as agents, 
thus allowing them to check if that is a possible contributing factor to the declining price 
phenomenon. More specifically, there are three treatments in their experiment, and they 
use between-subject design, which means one subject can only participate in one 
treatment. The three treatments are baseline no-penalty treatment (NP treatment), penalty 
treatment (P treatment) and agent treatment (AP treatment), respectively. For the latter 
two treatments, the bidders both act as agents. The only difference is that the penalty 
treatment allows bids greater than the private values, whereas the agent treatment 
prohibits this.  
To create an environment where the bidders can act as agents, they impose a penalty for 
the bidder to pay whenever he fails to acquire an item. In this chapter, we re-examine the 
data provided by Keser and Olson (1996) because we are interested in one research 
question - when bidders face a penalty, would they bid as the RNNE model predicts? We 
have analysed the influence of a payback scheme in the first-price private value auctions   
in Chapter 1. The main similarity of these two experimental designs is that the losers both 




experiment, the losers need to pay the initial capital balance back to the auction seller, 
whereas in the penalty treatment, the losers need to pay the penalty to the ‘principal’. 
Therefore, by combining and contrasting the findings from Chapter 1 with our analysis 
of Keser and Olson’s P treatment, an improved understanding of how bidders respond to 
a monetary loss in the auction context can be achieved.   
We derive the RNNE bidding strategy for the NP and P treatments in Section 3.2 above. 
However, it is difficult to pin down the Nash equilibrium bidding strategy for the AP 
treatment with the confounding effects of the penalty as well as a restriction on the bids.  
The no-penalty treatment (NP treatment) is composed of four sessions. In each session, 
eight single-unit demand bidders compete for four identical items. The selling of the four 
units is through a format of sequential auction which includes four stages, and in each 
stage one unit is sold. The eight bidders’ private values are drawn from [1, 1000] tokens 
with an identical chance of any integer. At the beginning of the auction, each bidder 
knows his private value for the item. In the first stage, each bidder submits a bid for the 
first unit.  
The winner is the one who submits the highest bid, and his bid is disclosed before the 
start of the second stage. The winner acquires the first item at the price he bids and does 
not participate in the rest of the auction. In the second stage, each remaining bidder 
submits a bid for the second unit, and the bidder with the highest bid wins the unit with 
his bid being revealed to the others. At the same time, his participation in the auction is 
over. The same process continues for the third and the last auction stage, after which the 
auction concludes. Such a sequential auction is repetitively conducted for twenty rounds, 
and before each auction, a private value is drawn from the same distribution [1, 1000] 




The penalty treatment (P treatment) is similar to the NP treatment, except that the four 
losers who fail to obtain a unit need to pay a penalty worth 100 tokens each. Both 




In this section, the main research question is would the existence of a penalty influence 
the bidders’ behaviour as predicted in Section 3.2? To address this issue, we discuss five 
conjectures in each subsequent section. The conjectures for the P treatment are as follows: 
 Conjecture 1: The bidders use a monotonic increasing bidding strategy. 
 Conjecture 2: The price is constant for all four stages. 
 Conjecture 3: The seller’s revenue is greater compared with the NP treatment. 
 Conjecture 4: The bids are independent from the price of the previous stage. 
 Conjecture 5: The allocation efficiency is 100% for all four stages. 
Keser and Olson (1996) also discuss Conjectures 2 and 5 in their paper. More specifically, 
they identify that the average price decrease for the four stages as well as the first two 
units’ prices are not significantly different by using a parametric test. With regards to the 
allocation efficiency, they treat a sequential auction as efficient as long as the four winners 
are the bidders with the four highest values, while not taking the order of the four units 
into consideration. Besides the discussion of these two conjectures, they also estimate the 
linear and quadratic bidding functions, which is relevant to Conjecture 1 in this chapter. 
However, they do not check the monotonicity. Different from their methods, we will 
explore the answers to such questions drawing on the techniques adopted by Neugebauer 




tests for independent or related samples (see Siegel & Castellan, 1988), and treating each 
auction stage separately when measuring the allocation efficiency. 50     
3.4.1 Piecewise bid functions 
 
For the auction of each unit in the P treatment, if the bidders bid according to the risk 
neutral Nash Equilibrium bidding strategy, bidding functions would be monotonic 
increasing in values. Then the bidding curve should be linear with respect to each auction 
stage. The bidder with the highest private value wins the first unit, and the second highest 
private value bidder wins the second unit, and so on. Therefore, the allocation efficiency 
should be 100%.  
Keser and Olson (1996) use OLS regression to estimate both linear and quadratic bid 
functions without an intercept, and find that the quadratic bid function fits the data better. 
At the same time, they identify that the bidders increase their bids for each subsequent 
unit as predicted. In addition to their analysis, we estimate a piecewise linear bidding 
function to check whether bidders use a monotonic increasing bid strategy. Here we adopt 
the same method as Neugebauer and Pezanis-Christou (2007) who assume four equal 
segments for their piecewise linear bidding function estimation. The four segments of our 
bidding function are [1,250] as the low value range; (250,500] and (500,750] as the 
first and the second half of the intermediate value range; and (750,1000] as the high 
value range. The estimated piecewise linear bidding functions are reported in Table 3.4.1. 
We first analyse the P treatment since the bidding behaviour in this treatment is our main 
research interest. Note that even though there is no theoretical prediction for the AP 
treatment, it is still beneficial to consider the corresponding results together with the P 
                                                          
50 The nonparametric techniques do not assume any distribution and only rely on ranking tests, and are 




treatment.  Secondly, we consider the NP treatment and compare it with a similar design 
by Neugebauer and Pezanis-Christou (2007).   
Intercept:  
 For the P treatment, the estimated intercepts for all four units are much less than 
the RNNE prediction (where penalty P= 100), which vary from 25.6% to 53.8% 
of the penalty. This result is quite similar to what we identify in Chapter 1 of the 
first-price auction with the payback scheme. In that experiment, the intercepts of 
the bidding functions are also smaller than the prediction. This common finding 
implies that when the subjects face a monetary loss, they would not change their 
bids as much as predicted.   
 For the AP treatment, the estimated intercepts for most units are insignificant 
except for the second unit, which is significantly negative.   
Slope:  
 For the P treatment, while the slope coefficients for most segments and units are 
positive, they are insignificant for the last segment over all four units. This 
violates our assumption of a monotonic increasing bidding strategy. With regards 
to the comparison between the bid slope and the RNNE prediction for each stage 
as shown in Table 3.2.1, we have  
o Bid>RNNE, for the low value bidders  
o Bid=RNNE, for the intermediate value bidders51                     
o Bid<RNNE, for the high value bidders.   
                                                          
51 The estimated slope for last unit bids of the bidders within the third segment is an exception as it is 




 For the AP treatment, the slope coefficients for the last segment are also 
insignificant, except that the last unit is significantly positive.  
 
Result (non-monotonicity in the P & AP treatments): The bidders use a non-monotonic 
increasing bid strategy, although this doesn’t hold for the last unit in the AP treatment.   
Figure 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 plot the estimated bidding functions for the P and AP treatment, 
respectively. Each graph plots actual bids against private values for a given unit. The 
green ‘RNNE’ line represents the RNNE-predicted bidding function. The red ‘B=PV’ 
line represents all points where bid equals private value. The black ‘Est.’ line represents 




Figure 3.4.1 Estimated piecewise linear bid functions, bids, and RNNE predictions in 






























































































Figure 3.4.2 Estimated piecewise linear bid functions and bids in the AP treatment 
 
Having analysed the two treatments with penalty, it is necessary to identify whether the 
bids in the NP treatment follow a monotonic increasing bid strategy. From Table 3.4.1, it 
can be seen that this is the case since the slope coefficients are positive.52 
Result (monotonicity in the NP treatment): The bidders use a monotonic increasing bid 
strategy.  
Such a finding is different from the experiment result reported by Neugebauer and 
Pezanis-Christou (2007). In their supply certainty treatment, the bidders use a non-
                                                          
52 The slope coefficient for the 3rd unit in the range of (500,750] is insignificant. However, following the 
same method as Neugebauer and Pezanis-Christou (2007) who deal with this issue, we can still say the NP 




























































































monotonic bidding strategy not only over all 100 rounds but also more specifically for 
the last 25 rounds.53 
Result (bid slope vs prediction in the NP treatment):   
 Bid>RNNE, for the low value and the first half of the intermediate value bidders  




Figure 3.4.3 Estimated piecewise linear bid functions, bids, and RNNE predictions in 
the NP treatment 
 
                                                          




























































































Table 3.4.1 Estimated piecewise linear functions  
Treat
ment P   AP   NP 
Unit 1st 2nd 3rd 4th   1st 2nd 3rd 4th   1st 2nd 3rd 4th 
Int. 
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# Obs 640 560 480 400  640 560 480 400  640 560 480 400 
Adj. 
R2 0.60 0.55 0.60 0.77   0.64 0.75 0.84 0.90   0.72 0.79 0.85 0.90 
Note: ‘Int.’ means intercept; ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’, and ‘4’ are the estimated slopes for the four 
segments [1,250], (250,500], (500,750], 𝑎𝑛𝑑(750,1000] respectively. Bold figures indicate that the estimates are not significantly different 




This sharp difference in the slopes of the estimated bid functions for private values greater 
or smaller than 500 is also visually shown in Figure 3.4.3. The major difference between 
these slopes is also identified by Neugebauer and Pezanis-Christou (2007) in their 
experiment, which naturally formed the basis for separately analysing high and low value 
bidders’ behaviour in their paper. They use the word “wait-and-see” to describe the 
behaviour for the high value bidders who do not bid as aggressively as low value bidders.   
Intercept: The intercepts for the first three units are not significantly different from zero 
and this is correctly predicted by RNNE, whereas it is significantly negative for the last 
unit. Neugebauer and Pezanis-Christou (2007) report a different result, which is for most 
units, the intercepts are significantly negative. 
To address the question of how adding the penalty P in the sequential auction would 
influence the bidders’ behaviour in the P treatment, we conclude as follows:  
 The bidders use non-monotonic increasing bid strategies in all four stages.  
 The intercepts of the bidding strategies across all four stages are all much smaller 
than the value of P.  
Therefore, it can be said that the penalty does not influence the bids as we predicted from 
the theoretical framework. 
 
3.4.2 Price behaviour 
 
There are two questions that need to be answered in this section: 
 Are the prices of four units’ constant? 




From Table 3.4.2, we can see that in all three treatments, the mean prices over the four 
units are decreasing.54 Keser and Olson (1996) have also identified the declining price 
phenomenon. They find that decreasing prices are more common from unit 1 to 2 and unit 
2 to 3, and less common from unit 3 to 4 in all three treatments.   
 
Table 3.4.2 Observed average prices in the three treatments  
Treatment P   AP   NP   P-NP   P-AP    AP-NP 
Unit            
1st 615.1  510.4  544.0  71.1  104.7  -33.6
b 
2nd 570.3  492.8  504.1  66.2  77.5  -11.3
b 
3rd 561.9a  476.1  482.9  79.0
a  85.8  -6.8
b 
4th 559.4a   476.0   472.1   87.3a   83.4   3.9b 
Note: The observed average price for each unit in the corresponding treatment is the 
realized average price across all four sessions. Bold figures with ‘a’ indicate that the 
estimates are not significantly different from the RNNE predictions at 𝛼 = 0.01. Bold 
figures with ‘b’ indicate that the estimates are not significantly different from zero at 𝛼 =
0.01.   
  
 
However, it is necessary to use a nonparametric Friedman test to check whether 
statistically the prices for all four units are drawn from the same population or not. From 
the results of this test, we cannot reject that in the AP treatment, the prices are constant, 
whereas for both the P and NP treatments, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level, 
which means at least one unit price is not from the same population as the other unit prices. 
Dunn’s test has been used to pin down which unit price is from a different population.55 
The result shows that the first unit price is significantly different from the other three units 
at the 5% level whereas the prices of the other three units are from the same population. 
                                                          
54 In both NP and AP treatments, the observed average prices of all four units reported in Table 3 of Keser 
and Olson (1996, p. 165) are different from our results.  
55 Dunn’s test is a nonparametric test used when Kruskal–Wallis test or Friedman’s test has been rejected, 




This shows that in both the P and NP treatments, the price declining phenomenon actually 
only significantly exists for the first two stages.  
Result AP treatment (constant price):    
1 2 3 4
AP AP AP APP P P P    
 
Result P & NP treatments (declining price trend):    
1 2 3 4
P P P PP P P P    
                                                                             
1 2 3 4
NP NP NP NPP P P P    
 
After addressing the price trend, we check if each unit’s realised price is the same as 
predicted in Table 3.2.1. We use the Wilcoxon signed rank test and find that the prices of 
the first two units are significantly higher than the RNNE predictions for both the P and 
NP treatments. However, for the last two unit’s different results were obtained. That is, 
the prices of the last two units are significantly higher than predicted in the NP treatment, 
but not in the P treatment.  





































It is instructive to compare the result of the NP treatment with Neugebauer and Pezanis-




(2007) experiment, the first 20 rounds also shows a declining price trend as in the NP 
treatment. However, when it comes to the 100 rounds overall, they identify a trend-free 
price. As they summarise, ‘With experience, behaviour settled into a heuristic that leads 
to the law of one price.’ Besides the price trend, they also find that the prices of the four 
units are significantly higher than predicted which accords with the NP treatment.  
It is also useful to conduct a cross-treatment test. Since we do not have theoretical 
predictions for the AP treatment, we intuitively compare the realized price for each unit 
in thus treatment with the corresponding results in the P and NP treatments. As a result, 
using the ranksum test, the prices in the AP treatment are always significantly smaller 
than the P treatment, but are not significantly different from the NP treatment.   
Result (across AP and P treatments):   
AP PP P   
Result (across AP and NP treatments):
AP NPP P  
 
For the P and NP treatments, not surprisingly, the prices of all four units in the P treatment 
are higher than in the NP treatment at a 1% level of significance. We also want to 
quantitatively pin down the actual difference and to see if that is the same as we predicted 
from the RNNE model, which is 100. Comparing the price difference of each unit across 
the two treatments, it is significantly smaller than predicted for the first two units whereas 
it is not significantly different from our prediction for the last two units.56   
Result (across P and NP treatments): The price differences for the first two units are 
smaller than the RNNE prediction whereas the price differences for the last two units are 
not significantly different from the prediction. 
 
                                                          




3.4.3 Seller’s revenue 
 
In this section, we restrict our analysis to two treatments only - NP and P, and look at how 
imposing a penalty would influence the seller’s revenue and whether the influence is the 
same as the RNNE model predicts. Therefore, in conjunction with Chapter 1, which 
analyses the impact of a payback scheme given to the bidders in first-price private value 
auctions, we have a full picture of how a device leading to the monetary loss to the bidders 
would affect the seller’s revenue.  
We use a pooled OLS regression model which includes a dummy variable for the 
treatment to test the following two hypotheses 
 𝐻10 ∶ 𝑅𝑁𝑃 = 1777.4  
   𝐻20 ∶ 𝑅𝑃−𝑅𝑁𝑃 = 400  
The model is as follows 
 𝑅𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑃𝑘𝑡 + 𝑢𝑘 + 𝜀𝑘𝑡 (3.4.1) 
 
In equation (3.4.1), 𝑅𝑘𝑡 denotes the seller’s revenue for round 𝑡 in session 𝑘, where 𝑘 =
{1, 2, 3, 4} , 𝑡 = {1, 2, … , 20}  and the dummy variable 𝐷𝑃𝑘𝑡 = {
0, Treatment NP
1, Treatment P
.  𝛽0 
and 𝛽1 are the parameters to be estimated. 𝜀𝑘𝑡  is an error term with mean zero and 
variance 𝜎𝜀
2; 𝑢𝑘 is the group-specific term. Table 3.4.3 shows the estimation results. From 
the Wald test of the estimated coefficients of 𝛽0 and 𝛽1, we have to reject 𝐻10 and accept 
the alternative hypothesis that the revenue in the NP treatment is significantly greater than 
predicted (p-value= 0.003). At the same time, we fail to reject 𝐻20 which indicates that 
the revenue difference between the two treatments is as we predicted from the RNNE 




Table 3.4.3 Coefficients of pooled OLS regression  
  Independent Dependent variable: 
  Variable   Revenue   
   
  
 Intercept  2003.06* 
 
   (49.98) 
 
 DP  303.59* 
 
   (63.97) 
 
  #Observations 160   
Note: robust standard errors are shown in parentheses; * significant at 5%.  
 
Result (revenue):  𝑅𝑁𝑃 > 1777.4 
                          𝑅𝑃−𝑅𝑁𝑃 = 400 
 
3.4.4 Independence of bids to past prices 
 
According to the risk neutral bidding strategy derived from Section 3.2, the bids in stage 
𝑡 (𝑡 > 1) should be unrelated to the price observed in the previous stage 𝑡 − 1. We test 
this hypothesis by regressing stage 𝑡 bids on stage 𝑡 − 1 prices splitting the private values 
into four equal segments as in Section 3.4.1. The model is as follows  
0 1 1 2 2 1 3 3 1 4 4 1 0( ) ( ) ( )  t t t t tBid Price PV Price PV Price PV Price e                 
 
Where 
 2 1PV   for the first half of the intermediate value bidders, and zero otherwise;  
 3 1PV   for the second half of the intermediate value bidders, and zero otherwise;  
 4 1PV   for the high value bidders, and zero otherwise.   
 
Therefore, for the private value categories: low value, first half of the intermediate value, 




the past price is given by 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 , 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 ,  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 , and 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 +
𝛽4 respectively. The estimation outcomes are reported in Table 3.4.4.   
 
Table 3.4.4 Bids’ dependence to past prices 
Treatment P AP NP 
Unit Bidt=2 Bidt=3 Bidt=4 Bidt=2 Bidt=3 Bidt=4 Bidt=2 Bidt=3 Bidt=4 
 
         
1×Pricet-1 -0.21 -0.08 -0.09 -0.13 -0.01 0.01 -0.25 -0.18 -0.09 
2× Pricet-1 0.09 0.28 0.35 0.28 0.44 0.52 0.13 0.25 0.41 
3× Pricet-1 0.28 0.50 0.56 0.49 0.66 0.79 0.36 0.52 0.71 
4× Pricet-1 0.37 0.57 0.69 0.58 0.75 0.92 0.42 0.58 0.82 
          
# Obs 560 480 400 560 480 400 560 480 400 
Adj. R2 0.50 0.57 0.72 0.72 0.80 0.83 0.70 0.78 0.82 
Note: Bold figures indicate that the estimates are not significantly different from 0 at 𝛼 =
0.05 . ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’ and ‘4’ are still the estimated slopes for the four 
segments [1,250], (250,500], (500,750], 𝑎𝑛𝑑(750,1000] respectively. 
 
If the bids are independent from previous prices as per the RNNE prediction, then each 
coefficient in Table 3.4.4 should be zero. However, for all three treatments, except for the 
first segment, the correlation between bids and previous prices is mostly significantly 
positive, which violates the independence hypothesis. As a result, since it is known that 
the bids relate to the previous prices, it raises two questions: one is whether the correlation 
changes or not for the last three units; the other is whether the correlation is the same for 
all the four segments.  
Answering the above questions, we can observe from Table 3.4.4 that as the auction 
unravels from the second to the last stage, the correlation becomes stronger. In addition, 
comparing the four segments, the correlation of bids to the previous prices goes up as 




Result (bid dependency): In all three treatments, the bids are dependent on the previous 
prices. The dependency becomes stronger as the auction unravels and as private value 
increases.    
We are also interested in whether the extent of bid dependency on previous prices differs 
across the three treatments. Since the bidders in the P and AP treatments know that they 
have to pay the penalty if they fail to obtain an item, we conjecture that if the bids depend 
on previous prices, then the dependency would be stronger in the P and AP treatments. 
From Table 3.4.4, we can observe that compared to the NP treatment, indeed the bid 
dependency is stronger for the AP treatment. However, the dependency is the weakest for 
the P treatment. 
Result (bid dependency across treatments):  AP>NP>P 
There are examples of other literature also identifying this bid dependent behaviour in 
sequential auctions. For example, Neugebauer (2004) finds that more than half of the 
bidding strategies exhibit price dependence. Besides this, Neugebauer and Pezanis-
Christou (2007) find such an ‘anchor’ phenomenon in both the supply certainty and 
uncertainty treatments. Moreover, they also report that the high value bidders ‘anchor’ 
more than the low value bidders do, which is in line with our finding. Therefore, by re-
analysing the data from Keser and Olson’s (1996) sequential auction, we provide broad 





3.4.5 Allocation efficiency    
 
From the previous sections, it is known that in the P treatment, the bidding behaviour is not as 
we predicted in several ways. Firstly, it appears to be non-monotonic increasing for all four 
units. Secondly, it relates to the price of the previous unit. Under these two conditions, naturally 
we would doubt whether the allocation is efficient as RNNE predicts.  
Keser and Olson (1996) have reported a 98% allocation efficiency for all three treatments. 
However, this extremely high efficiency is due to the measurement method they use. They treat 
the sequential auction as a simultaneous multi-unit auction for computing the efficiency. That 
is, if the four bidders with the highest four private values win the objects then as a whole the 
allocation efficiency is 100%. The drawback of this approach to decide whether a sequential 
auction is efficient or not is neglecting an important feature of sequential auctions - the selling 
of the four objects does not occur simultaneously. Therefore, in this section, following the same 
method as Neugebauer and Pezanis-Christou (2007), who measure the efficiency in terms of 
the proportion of allocations to bidders whose value ranking was lower than or equal to the 
order of units were offered, the allocation efficiency for sequential auctions is computed as 
follows 
100%,     
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We use an example to illustrate the first line in the equation. Suppose that the bidder with the 




efficient, but surely it is not so for the first unit. For each unit in a treatment, we report the mean 
efficiency of the four sessions in Table 3.4.5.  
It would be expected that the last unit auction is the most efficient, since the requirement of the 
last unit auction being efficient is the most lenient which is the winner is one of the top four 
highest value bidders. For the same reason, the first unit auction should be the least efficient 
one. From Table 3.4.5, we can see that the mean value of efficiency for the last unit is indeed 
the highest for all the treatments. However, just relying on the statistic of mean values is not 
particularly rigorous. Therefore, we also use a nonparametric Page test to verify this hypothesis. 
Let 𝑒𝑘 be the population median for the 𝑘𝑡ℎ unit efficiency. Then we write the null hypothesis 
as 
0 1 2 3 4: H e e e e    
 
And the alternative hypothesis we want to verify as 
 
1 1 2 3 4: H e e e e    
 
The result of the Page test reveals a monotonic trend for the inefficiency (p < 0.01) for all 
three treatments, which means at least one of the differences in 𝐻1  is a strict inequality. 
Furthermore, post hoc Dunn’s testing shows that in all three treatments, the last unit is 
significantly more efficient than the first three units. In addition to that, in the NP treatment, the 
efficiencies of the four units have a significant increasing trend, whereas in the AP treatment, 
the efficiency of the second unit is greater than the first unit, but we cannot reject that the 
efficiencies for the second and the third units are the same. Figure 3.4.4 visually presents the 




certainty treatment reported by Neugebauer and Pezanis-Christou (2007), they find a relatively 
lower allocation efficiency for the first two units compared to the supply uncertainty treatment, 
which implies that high value bidders tend to ‘wait and see’ regarding sales of early units, thus 
giving low value bidders a chance to win these early units in the supply certainty treatment. In 
this chapter, all the three treatments have no supply uncertainty and also support the existence 
of the ‘wait and see’ phenomenon, as was observed from the relative inefficiency for the first 
three units.       
 
Table 3.4.5 Mean efficiency by treatments 
Treatment Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4 
P 92.30% 89.70% 89.70% 96.20% 
AP 87.36% 94.49% 95.08% 98.49% 
























Result (efficiency ranking):                1 2 3 4P P P Pe e e e    
                                                                   
1 2 3 4
AP AP AP APe e e e    
     
1 2 3 4
NP NP NP NPe e e e    
 
After identifying the allocation efficiencies for the three treatments, we conduct a cross-
treatment analysis to compare across the three treatments. We conjecture that in the P and AP 
treatments, the high value bidders would have a stronger incentive to obtain an item to avoid 
paying the penalty compared to the NP treatment, so if that is the case, the efficiency in these 
two treatments should be higher. However, from Table 3.4.5 and Figure 3.4.4, it is observed 
that the mean efficiency is not very different among these three treatments. When we use a 
stricter nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis test, we find that there is no significant difference in the 
efficiencies among these three treatments (p-value= 0.515).  
Result (across treatments):   𝑒𝑃 = 𝑒𝐴𝑃 = 𝑒𝑁𝑃 
 
 
 3.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter provides the deviation of the RNNE bidding strategy for each stage in sequential 
auctions with private values and single-unit demand with the presence of a penalty and analyses 
the effects of the penalty in such auctions. The data we use is from Keser and Olson (1996) and 
includes three treatments: No-penalty, Penalty, and Agent.  
By re-examining the Penalty treatment, we identify some results that Keser and Olson (1996) 




 By estimating the piecewise linear bidding functions for each stage, we show that the 
bidding strategies are actually non-monotonic instead of concave increasing, and also 
depend on the previous unit’s price;  
 By computing the allocation efficiency on the basis of each stage instead of treating 
them as a whole, we find that the first three units are relatively less efficient than the 
last unit, which suggests the high value bidders use a ‘wait-and-see’ bidding strategy 
while giving the low value bidders some chance to win the early units; and  
 The seller’s revenue is greater compared to the No-penalty treatment.  
Although the penalty is not designed to enhance the seller’s revenue, it still provides us with 
some insights to consider along with the findings in Chapter 1 in relation to the payback scheme. 
The payback scheme increases the seller’s revenue only if we determine a proper amount of 
initial capital balance K relative to the maximum private value; otherwise, even though the bids 
increase, it cannot offset the amount K retained by the winner, which results in revenue 
decreasing. With regards to the penalty treatment, the revenue always increases if the realised 
bids increase. At the same time, both the payback scheme and the penalty device indicate that 
when the bidders face a monetary loss, they would not respond as much as predicted. 
Other features need to be taken into consideration to further analyse the effects of a penalty in 
sequential auctions, such as budget constraint and loss aversion. However, it is believed that by 
providing a detailed model and analysing the treatment effects of a penalty, this chapter can 
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Welcome to the experiment! 
You will receive a show-up payment of $10 for participating in this experiment which consists 
of four independent parts. For each of these four parts, you will be given written instructions 
which will be read aloud. 
In each part of the experiment, you will get a payoff which will depend both on your decisions 
and on chance. 
To determine your earnings for participating in this experiment, the payoffs you get in these 
four parts will be added to your show-up payment of $10. 
Note that in Part 1, your payoff may be positive or negative. Positive payoffs are added to your 
show-up fee of $10 whereas negative payoffs are subtracted from it. 
You are not allowed to communicate with other participants during the experiment. 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and someone will answer your questions 
individually. 
If you have no questions, then please proceed to reading the instructions for Part 1. 
  
Part 1: lotteries 
 
In this first part, you are asked to answer fourteen questions. Each of these questions asks 
whether you want to participate or not in a lottery which yields a win (in dollars) with 50% 
chance and a loss (in dollars) with 50% chance. If you would like to participate in the proposed 
lottery, please select “Yes” or if you do not wish to, then select “No”. Each of the fourteen 
questions relates to a different lottery for which you have to decide whether to participate or 
not by answering “Yes” or “No”. 
At the end of the experiment, one of the fourteen questions will be randomly selected to 
determine your payoff for participating in this first part. If you answered “Yes” to the selected 
question, then you will participate in the selected lottery and your payoff for participating in 
this first part will be equal to the outcome of this lottery. If you selected “No” then you will not 
participate in the selected lottery and your payoff for this first part will be $0. 
 
Example: suppose that at the end of the experiment, question 3 is drawn. Assume that question 
3 asked whether you want to participate in a lottery in which you can either win $X with 50% 




         If you answered “Yes” to question 3, then your payoff for participating in this first part 
will be the outcome of the proposed lottery. It can either be a gain of $X or a loss of $Y. 
         If you answered “No” to question 3, then your payoff for participating in this first part 
will be $0. 
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and someone will answer your questions 
individually. 
If you have no questions, then please answer the following comprehension questions. Note that 
your answers to these questions do not affect your earnings in any way. The purpose of these 
questions is just to make sure that you understand the game you are about to play. 
 
Part 2: selling a lottery ticket 
 
In this second part, you are the owner of eleven lottery tickets. Each of these lottery tickets 
yields a high payoff with 50% chance or a low payoff with 50% chance, and you are given an 
opportunity to sell the tickets. 
If you want to sell your lottery ticket, then you must state a ‘selling price’ between the low 
payoff and the high payoff (which can be equal to the low or high payoff). A ‘selling price’ is 
the minimum price at which you are willing to sell your lottery ticket. 
The buyer of your lottery ticket is played by the computer which has been programmed to 
make a random ‘buying price’ between the low payoff and the high payoff (inclusive). This 
means that the computer can offer any ‘buying price’ between the low payoff and the high 
payoff (inclusive) with equal chance. Note that the computer’s ‘buying price’ does not depend 
in any way on your ‘selling price’ and that it can have up to two decimals. 
At the end of the experiment, one of the eleven lottery tickets will be randomly selected to 
determine your payoff for participating in this second part. 
 
There are two possible outcomes: 
 First, your ‘selling price’ is greater than the computer’s ‘buying price’. In this case, 
you do not sell your lottery ticket and your payoff, which will be determined at the 
end of the experiment, will be equal to the outcome of the lottery. That is, you will 
either earn the high payoff with 50% chance or the low payoff with 50% chance. 
 Second, your ‘selling price’ is smaller or equal to the computer’s ‘buying price’. In 
this case, you do sell your lottery ticket and your payoff will be equal to the 






Example: suppose that at the end of the experiment, lottery 5 is drawn. Assume that in this 
lottery you can either gain $7 with 50% chance or gain $2 with 50% chance and you state $4 
as the ‘selling price’.  
If the computer’s ‘buying price’ is $5, then you sell your lottery ticket to the computer and your 
payoff for participating in this second part will be equal to $5. 
 If, on the other hand, it turns out that the computer’s ‘buying price’ is $3, then you keep your 
lottery ticket and your payoff for participating in this second part will be equal to the outcome 
of the lottery, that is, you will either receive a payoff of $7 with 50% chance or of $2 with 50% 
chance.  
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and someone will answer your questions 
individually. 
If you have no questions, then please answer the following comprehension questions. Note that 
your answers to these questions do not affect your earnings in any way. The purpose of these 
questions is just to make sure that you understand the game you are about to play. 
 
Part 3: Auction I 
In this third part, you are competing in a market with six buyers and you are one of them. The 
other five buyers are other participants in this lab.   
You are participating in 20 auctions with the same group of buyers.  
At the beginning of each auction, the computer will randomly determine a value for you, 
which may be any cent amount between and including $0.00 and $10.00, with each amount in 
this interval being equally likely to be chosen.     
The values for other bidders are also randomly drawn, with each cent amount between $0.00 
and $10.00 being equally likely.  
Your value will be independent of any other buyer's value and is also independent of your own 
value in other auctions. 
You can submit any bid up to your value (with up to two decimals). If you do not want to 
participate in this auction, then you must submit a bid of $0. 
      If you submit the highest bid then you win the auction. In this case, you pay a price equal 
to your bid and get the following payoff: 
Your payoff = your value - your bid        (if you win) 
      If your bid is not the highest then you lose the auction. In this case, you get the following 




Your payoff = 0                                          (if you lose) 
 
If there is no single highest bid, then one of the equal highest bidders will be randomly 
determined as the winner of the auction.  
At the end of each auction, you will find out whether you have won or lost the auction, the 
payoff you have, and what is the highest bid.   
At the end of the experiment, two of the 20 auctions will be randomly selected to determine 
your payoff for participating in this third part. 
 
Example: suppose that at the end of the experiment, auctions 6 and 12 are drawn and your 
payoffs for the two auctions are the following: 
        Auction 6: $A 
        Auction 12: $B 
Your earnings from this third part will be equal to: $A+$B.  
       Assume that in auction 6, you have a value of $ 9, and you submit a bid of $ 6.  
      If you are the winner, your payoff for participating in auction 6 is $9-$6 = $3.       
     If you lose the auction, your payoff for participating in auction 6 is $0.   
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and someone will answer your questions 
individually. 
If you have no questions, then please answer the following comprehension questions. Note that 
your answers to these questions do not affect your earnings in any way. The purpose of these 
questions is just to make sure that you understand the game you are about to play. 
 
Part 4: Auction II 
In this fourth and last part, you are participating in 20 auctions with the same group of buyers 
as in part 3.  
The basic setting for this part is the same as in part 3, which is: 
At the beginning of each auction, the computer will randomly determine a value for you, 
which may be any cent amount between and including $0.00 and $10.00, with each amount in 
this interval being equally likely to be chosen.     
The values for other bidders are also randomly drawn, with each cent amount between $0.00 




Your value will be independent of any other buyer's value and is also independent of your own 
value in other auctions. 
The difference in this part is:  
At the beginning of each auction, you are given $5. 
Your bid can be any cent amount up to your value plus $5. If you do not want to participate in 
this auction, then you must submit a bid of $0. 
  
        If you submit the highest bid then you win the auction. In this case, you keep the $5 and 
pay a price equal to your bid. Your payoff is defined as follows: 
Your payoff = $5 + your value – your bid         (if you win) 
       If your bid is not the highest then you lose the auction. In this case, you must give the $5 
back. Your payoff is defined as follows: 
Your payoff = $5- $5= 0                                       (if you lose) 
 
If there is no single highest bid, then one of the equal highest bidders will be randomly 
determined as the winner of the auction.  
At the end of each auction, you will find out whether you have won or lost the auction, the 
payoff you have, and what is the highest bid.   
At the end of the experiment, two of the 20 auctions will be randomly selected to determine 
your payoff for participating in this fourth part. 
 
Suppose that at the end of the experiment, auctions 6 and 12 are drawn and your payoffs for 
the two auctions are the following: 
        Auction 6: $A 
        Auction 12: $B 
Your earnings from this fourth part will be equal to: $A+$B.  
Example 1: Assume that in auction 6, you have a value of $ 9, and you submit a bid of $ 6.  
If you are the winner, you keep the $5, so your payoff for auction 6 is $5+$9-$6= $8. 
If you lose the auction, then you must pay the $5 back, so your payoff for auction 6 is $5-$5=$0.   
 
Example 2:  Assume that in auction 6, you have a value of $ 9, and you submit a bid of $ 12.  




If you lose the auction, then you must pay the $5 back, so your payoff for auction 6 is $5-$5=$0.   
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and someone will answer your questions 
individually. 
If you have no questions, then please answer the following comprehension questions. Note that 
your answers to these questions do not affect your earnings in any way. The purpose of these 




























The following equation is the first-order differentiation equation of Risk Averse symmetric 
Nash equilibrium (RASNE) bidding strategy.  
 
  𝑏′(𝑣𝑖) =


























 and they are known by the bidders. 
 
Therefore we can write equation (B.1) as follows 
 
 𝑏′(𝑣𝑖) + 𝑝(𝑣𝑖)𝑏(𝑣𝑖) = 𝑞(𝑣𝑖) 
 
Multiplying each side by an integrating factor 𝑚(𝑣), which yields  
 




And also in particular we require 
 
  𝑚(𝑣)𝑏′(𝑣𝑖) + 𝑚(𝑣)𝑝(𝑣𝑖)𝑏(𝑣𝑖) = [𝑚(𝑣)𝑏(𝑣𝑖)]′ 
 
So, equation (B.2) becomes 
 
[𝑚(𝑣)𝑏(𝑣𝑖)]
′ = 𝑚(𝑣)𝑞(𝑣𝑖) (B.3) 
 
 
















Integrating both sides y 
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Integrating both sides for equation (B.3) 

























































































Appendix C  
The estimated risk parameter for each subject in the cases of 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥=1 and 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥= 2 



































1(3) dfd10', (10) 1 0.993 -0.019 0.704** 7 0.841 0.991 -0.026 0.727** 6 0.751 
2 0.953 -0.027 0.765** 9 0.614 0.927 -0.01 0.668** 6 0.994 
3 0.902 0.02 0.664** 9 1.012 0.877 0.033 0.574** 6 1.484       
  
    
  
dfd3, (10) 1 0.603 0.1 0.461** 9 2.338 0.603 0.1 0.461** 9 2.338 
2 0.18 0.171 0.314 10 n.a. 0.081 0.192 0.27 9 n.a. 
3 0.123 0.188 0.297 8 n.a. 0.096 0.231 0.13 5 n.a.       
  
    
  
fdf10, (20) 1 0.949 -0.03 0.738** 17 0.710 0.925 -0.041 0.763** 14 0.621 
2 0.891 0 0.644** 16 1.106 0.81 -0.005 0.653** 12 1.063 
3 0.929 -0.021 0.767** 17 0.608 0.933 0.005 0.696** 16 0.874       
  
    
  
fdf3', (20) 1 0.836 0.041 0.609** 17 1.284 0.805 0.06 0.545** 14 1.670 
2 0.96 0.014 0.658** 18 1.040 0.921 0.018 0.636** 15 1.145 




    
  




1 0.934 -0.025 0.807** 19 0.478 0.933 -0.006 0.723** 15 0.766 
2 0.984 0.008 0.881** 15 0.270 0.953 0.001 0.904** 11 0.212 
3 0.98 0.004 0.723** 18 0.766 0.975 0.008 0.7** 15 0.857       
  
    
  
1 0.993  -0.037** 0.89** 19 n.a. 0.986  -0.041** 0.906** 14 n.a. 
𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥=1 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥=2 






2 0.943 -0.032 0.889** 16 0.250 0.829 0.007 0.767** 11 0.608 




2(4) dfd8', (10) 1 0.992 -0.009 0.908** 10 0.304 0.994 -0.021 0.938** 9 0.198 
2 0.992 -0.023 0.911** 9 0.293 0.998 -0.011 0.884** 6 0.394 
3 0.994 -0.028 0.913** 9 0.286 0.987 -0.029 0.917** 7 0.272 
4 0.978 -0.052 0.963** 8 0.115 0.977 -0.04 0.911** 7 0.398             
fdf8, (20) 1 0.995  -0.034** 0.955** 14 n.a. 0.995  -0.027** 0.928** 12 n.a. 
2 0.985 -0.025 0.912** 15 0.289 0.988 -0.02 0.892** 14 0.405 
3 0.986  -0.029** 0.882** 15 n.a. 0.989  -0.031** 0.879** 12 n.a. 
4 0.98  -0.054** 0.837** 19 n.a. 0.986  -0.055** 0.832** 15 n.a.              
4(4) fplonci1, (25) 1 0.992  -0.02** 0.956** 19 n.a. 0.981 -0.008 0.895** 14 0.352 
2 0.929 -0.032 0.895** 25 0.352 0.875 -0.041 0.919** 19 0.264 
3 0.957 -0.013 0.906** 23 0.311 0.907 -0.011 0.889** 17 0.375 
4 0.972  -0.037** 0.925** 20 n.a. 0.967  -0.044** 0.952** 19 n.a.       
  
    
  
fplonci2, (25) 1 0.579 0.084 0.665** 20 1.511 0.217 0.139 0.35 14 n.a. 
2 0.988 0.02 0.887** 25 0.382 0.999  -0.007** 0.981** 17 n.a. 
3 0.918 -0.03 0.994** 20 0.018 0.835 -0.027 0.980** 16 0.061 
4 0.998 0.001 0.95** 20 0.158 0.998 0 0.954** 19 0.145       
  
    
  
fplonci3, (25) 1 0.971 0.012 0.851** 22 0.525 0.975 0.003 0.872** 15 0.440 
2 0.962  -0.041** 0.907** 25 n.a. 0.958  -0.058** 0.963** 21 n.a. 
3 0.97  0.038** 0.806** 24 n.a. 0.962 0.033 0.818** 19 0.667 
4 0.786  0.09** 0.577** 22 n.a. 0.786  0.090** 0.577** 22 n.a.       
  
    
  
fplonci4, (25) 1 0.998 -0.004 0.975** 19 0.077 0.995 -0.001 0.959** 14 0.128 
2 0.994 0.006 0.935** 23 0.209 0.998 -0.005 0.978** 16 0.067 
3 0.997  0.015** 0.917** 21 n.a. 0.995 0.011 0.930** 16 0.226 




      
  
    
  
fplonci5, (25) 1 0.975 0.007 0.894** 21 0.356 0.967 -0.011 0.96** 14 0.125 
2 0.994 -0.001 0.951** 21 0.155 0.991 -0.009 0.980** 16 0.061 
3 0.999  0.006** 0.97** 20 n.a. 0.999 0.002 0.982** 16 0.055 
4 0.984  0.025** 0.818** 24 n.a. 0.996 -0.01 0.953** 19 0.148       
  
    
  
fplonci6, (25) 1 0.988 -0.007 0.91** 20 0.297 0.987  -0.025** 0.994** 13 n.a. 
2 0.961 0.023 0.837** 22 0.584 0.952 0.025 0.812** 15 0.695 
3 0.712 0.001 0.75** 21 1.000 0.647 0.026 0.658** 19 1.559 
4 0.956 0.015 0.775** 23 0.871 0.94 -0.033 0.950** 17 0.158       
  
    
  
fplonci7, (25) 1 0.998 -0.008 0.987** 19 0.040 0.995 -0.009 0.993** 14 0.021 
2 0.98 -0.002 0.864** 25 0.472 0.987 0.009 0.816** 19 0.676 
3 0.934 0.004 0.905** 18 0.315 0.907 0.017 0.859** 16 0.492 
4 0.998 -0.003 0.975** 20 0.077 0.996 -0.005 0.983** 18 0.052       
  
    
  
fplonci8, (25) 1 0.994 0.005 0.94** 19 0.191 0.998 0 0.964** 14 0.112 
2 0.919 -0.046 0.858** 24 0.497 0.892 -0.043 0.845** 21 0.550 
3 0.99 0 0.908** 23 0.304 0.988 -0.002 0.908** 17 0.304 
4 0.733 0.016 0.602** 24 1.983 0.524 0.051 0.471** 21 3.369       
  
    
  
fplonci9, (25) 1 0.978 -0.029 0.898** 17 0.341 0.97  -0.057** 1.017** 10 n.a. 
2 0.996 0.006 0.853** 23 0.517 0.995 0.009 0.844** 19 0.555 
3 0.978 -0.015 0.903** 21 0.322 0.961 -0.002 0.851** 15 0.525 
4 0.999 -0.002 0.993** 17 0.021 0.999 -0.003 0.997** 16 0.009       
    




1 0.974 0.046** 0.748** 19 n.a. 0.975 0.026 0.802** 11 0.741 
2 0.988 -0.015 0.993** 17 0.021 0.977 -0.014 0.988** 12 0.036 




4 0.892 0.031 0.754** 22 0.979 0.85 0.033 0.739** 19 1.060        
  




1 0.992 -0.012 0.965** 19 0.109 0.988 -0.018 0.988** 15 0.036 
2 0.835 -0.027 0.869** 20 0.452 0.755 -0.005 0.787** 18 0.812 
3 0.946 0.028 0.902** 18 0.326 0.916 0.05 0.841** 12 0.567 
4 0.969 0.055** 0.802** 17 n.a. 0.958 0.033 0.866** 13 0.464       
  




1 0.912 0.026 0.761** 20 0.942 0.881 0.035 0.704** 16 1.261 
2 0.979 -0.003 0.877** 23 0.421 0.977 -0.025 0.954** 18 0.145 
3 0.822 -0.041 0.839** 21 0.576 0.757 -0.038 0.815** 17 0.681 
4 0.857 0.105** 0.608** 18 n.a. 0.774 0.130** 0.504** 11 n.a.       
  




1 0.95 -0.004 0.805** 23 0.727 0.901 0.004 0.767** 17 0.911 
2 0.997 -0.007 0.982** 19 0.055 0.995 -0.008 0.988** 17 0.036 
3 0.994 0.01 0.942** 20 0.185 0.999 -0.014 0.986** 12 0.043 



















0.049** 0.961** 18 n.a. 0.979 
 -
0.041** 0.936** 15 n.a. 
2 0.99 
 -
0.038** 1.006** 15 n.a. 0.984 -0.034 0.993** 13 0.028 
3 0.995 -0.017 0.918** 16 0.357 0.989 -0.014 0.905** 11 0.420 
4 0.986 0.001 0.90** 15 0.444 0.984 -0.008 0.925** 14 0.324 
5 0.97 0.02 0.866** 19 0.619 0.959 0.03 0.832** 12 0.808 
 
             
dfd9, (10) 
1 0.996 -0.002 0.918** 7 0.357 0.991 0.013 0.876** 5 0.566 
2 0.952 -0.019 0.916** 7 0.367 0.927 -0.073 1.054** 6 0.001 
3 0.969 
 -
0.107** 1.035** 9 n.a. 0.947 -0.094 0.984** 6 0.065 
4 0.99 0.005 0.894** 10 0.474 0.99 -0.008 0.924** 8 0.329 
5 0.949 -0.149 0.942** 4 0.246 0.992 -0.227 1.107** 3 0.001 
                
7(6) 
dfd2ri, (10) 
1 0.994 -0.015 0.984** 9 0.081 0.994 -0.015 0.984** 9 0.081 
2 0.998 
 -
0.023**  0.957** 9 n.a. 0.997 -0.023 0.959** 7 0.214 
3 0.956 0.037 0.753** 10 1.640 0.956 0.037 0.753** 10 1.640 
4 0.939 -0.007 0.882** 7 0.669 0.939 -0.007 0.882** 7 0.669 
5 0.962 0.004 0.826** 9 1.053 0.969 0.008 0.799** 8 1.258 
6 0.827 -0.047 0.699** 10 2.153 0.842 -0.025 0.6** 9 3.333 
 
             
dfd4, (10) 
1 0.995 -0.027 0.968** 7 0.165 0.991 -0.029 0.973** 6 0.139 
2 0.65 -0.043 0.805** 8 1.211 0.445 -0.023 0.766** 6 1.527 
3 0.974 -0.04 0.926** 8 0.400 0.979 -0.041 0.920** 5 0.435 
4 0.996 
 -
0.024**  0.942** 9 n.a. 0.996 
 -
0.024**  0.942** 9 n.a. 




6 0.997 -0.017 0.964** 9 0.187 0.997 -0.015 0.957** 8 0.225 
 
             
fdf2', (20) 
1 0.992 0.003 0.96** 14 0.208 0.991 0.003 0.96** 12 0.208 
2 0.982 0.007 0.886** 19 0.643 0.99 -0.09 0.924** 15 0.411 
3 0.997 0.01 0.935** 18 0.348 0.996 0.007 0.943** 17 0.302 
4 0.95 -0.008 0.874** 17 0.721 0.927 -0.015 0.884** 12 0.656 
5 0.998 -0.005 0.968** 19 0.165 0.998 -0.005 0.968** 19 0.165 
6 0.997 
 -
0.015**  0.966** 19 n.a. 0.997 
 -
0.015**  0.966** 19 n.a. 
 
             
fdf4', (20) 
1 0.902 0.031 0.751** 17 1.658 0.902 0.031 0.751** 17 1.658 
2 0.989 -0.021 0.931** 17 0.371 0.989 -0.021 0.931** 17 0.371 
3 0.974 -0.032 0.928** 17 0.388 0.956 -0.02 0.896** 13 0.580 
4 0.942 -0.002 0.78** 19 1.410 0.942 -0.002 0.780** 19 1.410 
5 0.964 -0.01 0.873** 16 0.727 0.964 -0.01 0.873** 16 0.727 













8(9) fdf5', (20) 1 0.995 -0.017 1.000** 17 0.001 0.995 -0.017 1.000** 17 0.001 
2 0.969  -0.085**  1.025** 18 n.a. 0.943  -
0.081**  
1.01** 14 n.a. 
3 0.992  -0.052**  0.984** 18 n.a. 0.99  -
0.049**  
0.973** 16 n.a. 
4 0.995 -0.01 0.959** 18 0.342 0.996  -
0.025**  
0.997** 14 n.a. 
5 0.998 -0.001 0.971** 17 0.239 0.999  -
0.007**  
0.989** 16 n.a. 
6 0.994  -0.026**  0.984** 20 n.a. 0.995  -
0.026**  
0.981** 17 n.a. 
7 0.999 -0.004 0.990** 14 0.081 0.999 -0.003 0.988** 13 0.097 
8 0.992 0.003 0.946** 17 0.457 0.992 0.003 0.947** 16 0.448 
9 0.999  -0.015**  1.013** 20 n.a. 0.999  -
0.015**  
1.013** 20 n.a. 
      
  
    
  
dfd5, (10) 1 0.994 0.001 0.969** 10 0.256 0.996 -0.011 0.998** 9 0.016 
2 0.986 0.026 0.917** 10 0.724 0.999 -0.006 0.978** 8 0.180 
3 0.999  -0.022**  0.948** 8 n.a. 0.999  -
0.022**  
0.948** 8 n.a. 
4 0.953  -0.141**  1.126** 10 n.a. 0.953  -
0.141**  
1.126** 10 n.a. 
5 0.993 -0.014 0.962** 10 0.316 0.99 -0.009 0.952** 9 0.403 
6 0.989 -0.024 0.951** 10 0.412 0.989 -0.024 0.951** 10 0.412 
7 0.995  -0.04**  0.990** 10 n.a. 0.992  -
0.041**  
0.991** 9 n.a. 
8 0.994 -0.861 0.971** 6 0.239 0.998 0.014 0.951** 6 0.412 
9 0.959  -0.136**  1.19** 10 n.a. 0.959  -
0.136**  
1.19** 10 n.a. 
Note:  For the subjects whose 𝑟?̂? < 0 which shows an extremely risk averse attitude, we truncate the corresponding estimated risk parameters to 0.  
